THE SPANISH STATE OF THE AUTONOMIES

Architectonics and Public Management In a New Decentralized Democracy

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ABSTRACT

In an effort to strengthen Spain's new democracy, the framers of the 1978 Constitution devised formal mechanisms that would allow the State to grant some autonomy to its regions. These mechanisms were principally designed to accommodate the nationalist sentiments and autonomist demands of Spain's most developed regions: Catalonia and the Basque Country. The cultural distinctiveness and political aspirations of these regions had been firmly repressed under Franco. To the surprise of many observers, the opportunities for gaining some political and administrative autonomy were soon exploited not only by Catalonia and the Basque Country, but also by regions such as Andalusia where the basis for autonomist sentiments is essentially non-nationalist. As a consequence of these widespread autonomist demands, the central government within a few years approved a series of statutes establishing 17 Autonomous Communities which together cover peninsular Spain and the islands.

The process of building politico-administrative institutions in the Autonomous Communities is now under way. This paper is a preface to the study of that process. After sketching the origins of the current territorial organization of authority, I enumerate the centralizing and decentralizing institutions and symbols embedded in the current political order. The final section describes some techniques being employed in the Autonomous Communities of Andalusia and Valencia to meet the challenge of building and managing the institutions of Spain's new decentralized democracy.

> If within the next two centuries there is a happy and peaceful future awaiting Spain, one may predict that it will be in a weak and paternal socialist regime, giving ample regional and municipal autonomy; a regime not unlike the system under which Spain lived in the early seventeenth century.
>
> The Spanish Labyrinth

Some thirty-five years after Gerald Brenan published these words, Spain embarked upon an effort to create a complex set of political institutions -- ones designed to ensure both the unity of the Spanish nation and the autonomy of the nationalities and regions that comprise it.[1] Though its emergence was only dimly perceived during the early years of the transition (1975-78), the current constitutional order, known as the State of the Autonomies, may enable Spain to integrate the enduring yet contradictory impulses that have virtually eliminated democratic politics from modern Spanish history. As Spanish leaders and citizens move well beyond the stage of constitutional design, it remains unclear whether these institutions will indeed create a political order that is consistent with both liberal-democratic values and Spanish tradition. In this paper, I first examine the historical roots of the State of the Autonomies. This brief analysis helps place in perspective some specific institution-building measures, discussed below, which are taking place as Spain's law-givers edge away from center stage.

SPANISH POLITICAL TRADITIONS

The centralizing Spanish political tradition is intimately linked to the missions of three of the country's powerful institutions -- the monarchy, the army, and until the 19th century, the church -- as well as from the distinct, yet complementary symbols of national unity that these institutions have each long cultivated. Although these institutions created substantial bonds between the elements of the Spanish state, the absence of other ties enabled Castile and Aragon to preserve their own political identities well into the modern period.

In the midst of Spain's decline from western hegemony in the mid-17th century, a sustained attempt by the Catalans (the most distinctive national group of the Crown of Aragon) to dissolve its political ties to Castile was crushed by Castilian military force. In the early 18th century, following the War of the Spanish Succesession, the newly installed Bourbon monarchy managed to suppress the symbols and institutions of Catalan political identity, including formal rules of autonomy. Centralizing tendencies were further strengthened during the 19th century by the spirit of modern nationalism, by political reforms such as the partial unification of the legal system and the development of a system of territorial administration like that in post-revolutionary France, by other elements of the political program of the coalition of "liberal" classes which frequently ruled the central government, by trade policies that jointly protected Castilian wheat producers and Catalan industrialists from foreign competition, by repression of Catalan legal and cultural institutions, and by the development of a national market.

Set against these centralizing tendencies were a variety of anti-centralist political traditions, themselves products of partly independent, partly overlapping, and partly competing movements against the existing political and (in cases) social order. These movements germinated in the 19th century, when large landowners and other notables and bosses dominated the political order by manipulating parliamentary elections and by exercising strong influence over the military and the monarchy. In rural areas, where the overwhelming majority of the population lived, large landowners also dominated the social order through the enforcement of property rights, exchanges of favors, and control over the local police. By the late 19th century, this form of rule and the secularizing policies of the ruling political parties had been rejected by such diverse social forces as conservative peasants, the church, and, for different reasons, the commercial and industrial classes in the north and east, and by agricutural working classes in the south.

Simplifying greatly, we may say that the rejection of the 19th century Spanish political model by those in peripheral regions took reactionary, conservative bourgeois, and revolutionary forms (see table on next page). Under the banner of a dynastic struggle, relatively prosperous peasants in the north, beginning in 1833, joined with a defensive Catholic Church in launching a series of civil wars against the liberal-secular constitutional monarchy. After their final defeat in 1876, adherents to this infamous Carlist cause shifted their loyalties to distinct regional autonomy movements in the Basque country, Navarre, and Catalonia.

At about the same time, cultural entrepreneurs in Catalonia seized upon Castilian political and economic weakness, as well as wider

ANTI-CENTRALIST SPANISH POLITICAL TRADITIONS

	Basque country/ Navarre (North)	Catalonia (Northeast)	Andalusia (South)
Ideology	Carlism -- an extreme pro-clerical movement rejecting the ideas of the French Revolution for Spain as a whole. Drew also upon sentiments for local autonomy. Was defeated militarily by 1876, then transformed into several conservative regional autonomy movements. (n.b. The Navarrese resisted strengthening Basque nationalism.)	Catalan nationalism -- a movement that emphasized linguistic and other cultural differentia; sanctioned ideology of Catalan superiority over Castilian society, economy, and culture. Pro-clerical. Cultivated historical symbols of Catalan political separateness and economic achievement.	Rural anarchism -- influenced by diffusion of Bakunin's political philosophy to Spain. Rejected central authority and organized religion. Can be seen as an attempt to recreate primitive communes that existed in Spain in the 16th and 17th centuries. Habits of thought and actions are suggestive of a naive millenarianism (Brenan). Not a regional autonomy movement.
Social Base	Catholic Church -- attempted to regain its political function after having been displaced from prominence by rulers of the centralized polity. Joined by peasants who enjoyed secure land tenure or ownership. These were loyal to the Church and felt threatened by Liberal land policy. (n.b. The social base of Basque nationalism was the local bourgeoisie and Basque-speaking peasants.)	A bourgeois movement but closely allied with conservative pro-clerical social forces in town and country. (n.b. Challenged after WWI by urban anarcho-syndicalist working class, whose actions tempered bourgeois autonomist thrusts.)	Primarily landless rural laborers, increasingly alienated from the social, economic, political, and religious orders.
Institutions	Church and military organizations that fought "Carlist" civil wars against 19th century political order.	Civic, mutual insurance, and cultural organizations. Regional nationalist political party formed after 1900. Minimal but official autonomy granted in 1914-23. (Anarcho-syndicalists organized in CNT trade union.)	Relatively uninstitutionalized social movement. Coordination achieved more by mutually adaptive adjustments than by formal organization. Was difficult for authorities to repress permanently.

European trends, to fashion a new Catalan nationalism. An aesthetic and linguistic movement reinforced an emerging consciousness of Catalan distinctiveness from -- indeed superiority over -- those who ruled them from the economically backward Castilian heartland. Although Catalan nationalism rested to a substantial degree on a bourgeois social base, pro-clerical and -autonomistic elements of this ideology tended to secure the support of peasants and inhabitants in small towns (including many who had been sympathetic to the Carlists). Once a regional political party was created at the turn of the century, the visions and demands of Catalan nationalism quickly became one of the most salient features of the Spanish political landscape.

A strikingly different ideology -- anarchism -- inspired political action among poor landless laborers in Andalusia (as well as among urban workers in Catalonia). By its nature, anarchism was not a movement for Andalusian political autonomy. Indeed, this ideology explicitly rejected the principle that a social order requires governmental authority. A sporadic revolutionary and radically anti-clerical movement, which was manifested principally in land seizures and church burnings, rural Andalusian anarchism was ritually repressed by the forces of order.

These extremely varied anti-centralist movements reflected and enhanced the deep political crisis that culminated in an unstable Second Republic (1931-36), the Civil War (1936-39), and authoritarian rule under Franco (1939-75). During two particularly intense crises, Spain's political classes experimented with different organizational forms for the state. Historical memories of these ultimately unsuccessful efforts to integrate the centralizing and decentralizing impulses in Spanish

politics greatly influenced how the new State of the Autonomies unfolded after the death of Franco.

THREE TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY

Federalism was the category used to describe one design for the territorial organization of the Spanish Republic of 1873. The specific meaning given to federalism by some of its proponents was influenced more by anarchist political thought than by its contenders. For instance, one leading theoretician wrote that "by a federal government we understand a government founded on alliance." In this ideological milieu, local politicians throughout the east and south proclaimed the independence of their regions and municipalities from Madrid before a constitution could be written to specify particular federal arrangements. Indeed, political elites were unable to agree on a constitution for the Republic. As a by-product of this struggle over the form of the regime, the presidency changed hands four times in a year. Meanwhile, Carlist forces in the north reignited their civil war against the Spanish state. Faced with the disintegration of Spanish unity, the military soon acted to halt the country's experiment with republican government.

This short and unhappy experience led founders of the Second Republic, more than a half century later, to search for new formulae to achieve some territorial decentralization of political authority while maintaining the integrity of the nation-state. Since Catalan nationalist parties were crucial members of the coalition favoring a republican solution to the acute political crisis of 1930-31, intense

Catalan demands for autonomy were certain to be incorporated into the new constitution. In rejecting "federalism" as a possible design, republican leaders adopted a general principle, known as the principio dispositivo, that permitted the State to accede to formal demands for autonomy. Despite the generality of the principle, political leaders meant it to apply only to the Catalan case.

In 1932, less than one year after the Republic had come to power, the central government and legislature approved a statute granting Catalonia specific political liberties and the authority to establish autonomous political institutions, known collectively as the Generalitat. Although the process leading to territorial autonomy was also well under way in the Basque country and Galicia before the onset of the Civil War, only Catalonia was able to achieve formal autonomous status before that time.

In an attempt to unify pro-democratic political forces after Franco's death, Prime Minister Suarez agreed in 1977 to reinstate the Generalitat and its long-time president-in-exile. The specifics of the relationship between the State and regional-nationalist government or "pre-autonomy" were vague, but the principle of Catalan autonomy was firmly established by the prime minister's adroit political move. In 1978, drafters of the constitution reinvoked the principio dispositivo to specify the process by which autonomist demands could be accommodated. Apparently, the framers did not expect the opportunities presented by this formula to be seized by regions other than the historical-nationalist ones. But autonomist sentiments in Andalusia and elsewhere, based on essentially non-nationalist sources of regional identity, demonstrated the potentially wide scope with which the principio

dispositivo might be applied.

Shortly after the unsuccessful military coup against the democratic regime in February 1981, the central government commissioned a group of jurists to elaborate a formula for the generalization of the autonomy system throughout Spain. In July, the framework produced by the commission, chaired by Professor Eduardo García de Enterría, was accepted by the majority party (UCD) and the socialists (PSOE), the principal opposition party. Within two years, seventeen Autonomous Communities had been created by special statutes approved by the national parliament. Thus began the lengthy process of creating autonomous legislatures and administrations -- as well as that of educating a new political class to lead them.

In sum, like many facets of Spanish culture, the State of the Autonomies is syncretic. Though the constitutional order contains many elements of past regimes -- for instance, the monarchy and the principio dispositivo -- the current system is unambiguously novel in its territorial design for the state. For the first time, all the regions with the strongest historical bases for autonomist sentiments (Catalonia, the Basque country, and to a lesser extent, Galicia) enjoy formal institutions of political autonomy, endowed with certain legislative and administrative powers. Also for the first time, those regions in which anti-centralist sentiments are significant but nationalist ones are comparatively weak (for example, Andalusia and Valencia) have achieved the same standing and similar powers. As a by-product, however, many other regions have been thrust into the new order without any significant political or administrative preparation.

The search for an overarching concept to typify the new system is considered futile by Spanish jurists. Unlike the term "State of the

Autonomies," both federalism and regionalism fail to capture the complex legal structures that are designed to integrate the contradictory impulses of Spanish politics. For the present, at least, the system is best defined by enumerating its fundamental characteristics. The most important of these are listed on the next few pages, separated according to their centralizing or decentralizing qualities.

FROM LEGAL TO POLITICAL INSTITUTION-BUILDING

Now that the constitutional structure is fully developed, whether or not the new territorial design is to fulfill the political visions of its founders depends upon the ability of the new autonomous governments to consolidate their positions and provide public services.

In carrying out the tasks of political institution-building, officials in Catalonia and the Basque country enjoy a comparative advantage over their counterparts elsewhere. The governmental institutions of these communities automatically benefit from the legitimacy that follows successful political struggles, particularly ones with such historic significance as the Catalan and Basque drives for autonomy. In addition, the social infrastucture that accompanies the high levels of economic development that these two regions exhibit also makes the tasks of political institution-building relatively easy. On the other hand, leaders in these communities must continue to grapple with the problem of satisfying the nationalist aspirations of their peoples within the bounds of loyalty to the Spanish State.

Shifting our attention now to the Autonomous Communities of

ARCHITECTONICS OF "THE STATE OF THE AUTONOMIES"

Centralizing Institutions and Symbols

1) Monarchy. Symbol of the Spanish state. Traditional legitimacy of the institution augmented by the role that King Juan Carlos played in facilitating the transition to democracy.

2) Constitution. Institutionalized vision of Spanish political unity. Locates political sovereignty in the Spanish people, provides no juridical meaning to nationalities within Spain, reserves for the state the right to grant regional autonomy, and specifies particular institutions and rules that strengthen the central government.

3) Parliamentary system. Membership determined by direct popular election (providing, in the early American lexicon, a strong vertical axis). The role of the second chamber as a body representing the Autonomous Communities is still ambiguous.

4) Politicized military with mission to preserve Spanish unity. Through adaptive mutual adjustment, the military enhances the centralist leanings of political forces loyal to the democratic regime.

5) Constitutional principle of preemption. Control over some policy areas (e.g. economic and foreign affairs) is reserved exclusively to the central government.

6) Constitutional principle of supremacy (of laws of the state over those of the Autonomous Communities). Authority granted to the Constitutional Tribunal to interpret the constitution is similar to that assumed by the United States Supreme Court.

7) Constitutional principle of Federalismo de Ejecución. Implies that the Autonomous Communities should implement the basic norms and laws of the state (as in West Germany). Specific mechanisms, however, are not yet designed.

8) Highly developed continental juridical language. Can be used persuasively to define a wide range of policy areas as legitimate for state action. Dominant values of this legalistic tradition include order, coherence, and consistency among laws and government actions. Juridical habits of thought and language are widely diffused in the political class and to a large extent influence ordinary informed political discourse.

9) Long tradition of central governance and administration. Substantial prestige is still enjoyed by high state functionaries.

10) Rule of the central government by a dominant or "natural governing" party, the Socialists (PSOE). Leaders favor central control of the party apparatus and a strong central government.

11) Fiscal system that makes Autonomous Communities largely dependent on the state for financial resources.

ARCHITECTONICS OF "THE STATE OF THE AUTONOMIES"

Decentralizing Institutions and Symbols

1) Constitution. Legitimizes regional cultural and political differentiation within Spain. Sanctions the establishment of Autonomous Communities, subject to approval by parliament. Statutes of the Autonomous Communities are part of the constitutional order.

2) Autonomy statutes provide for the creation of regional legislatures and administrations and for assignment of specific authority. Considerable latitude with respect to cultural and educational policy (among other areas) is accorded to regional governments.

3) Authority over specific policy areas (known as competencias) is being transfered to the autonomies. This process is already completed in Andalusia and Catalonia). Some competencias are reserved exclusively to the Autonomous Communities; others are shared with the central government. The principle that each community should determine how its competencias will be managed is clearly articulated.

4) The political discourse of rights, liberties, and popular control (and to a lesser extent continental juridical language) can be marshaled persuasively in legitimating wide jurisdictions for the autonomous governments. Democracy and decentralization are linked in contemporary habits of thought.

5) The central administration is widely believed to be ineffective and inefficient. Decentralization is considered by many as one of the few strategies by which administration in Spain can be reformed. Some believe that the new governmental structure will release long-repressed energies among the Spanish peoples. All three beliefs generate goodwill towards the autonomies system.

6) A tradition of local self-government can be socially constructed from medieval and more recent precedents. The Autonomous Communities can attempt to appropriate this tradition from the provinces and municipalities that comprise them.

7) Regional nationalist political parties are dominant in the parliaments of Catalonia and the Basque country. (National parties are dominant elsewhere, e.g. the Socialists in Valencia and Andalusia and the conservative Coalicion Popular in Galicia.)

ARCHITECTONICS OF "THE STATE OF THE AUTONOMIES"

Coordination Devices

1) The complex system of centralizing and decentralizing institutions is itself a coordinating device. Through various kinds of mutual adjustment among authorities, coordination between central and regional governments may be achieved epiphenomenally.

2) Doctines of "cooperative federalism," which are influential at least among jurists who write on relations between the state and the Autonomous Communities, will likely encourage officials to probe for a wide variety of mechanisms to coordinate policy. Adaptation of techniqes employed elsewhere in Europe and perhaps the United States is to be expected.

3) The fiscal basis of the Autonomous Communities is still weak. One important coordination device therefore will be the Interterritorial Compensation Fund, though its future evolution is in doubt.

Valencia and Andalusia, we find that the intentional strengthening of regional sentiments figures prominently in the political strategies pursued by top officials in the Generalidad Valenciana and the Junta de Andalucía. The Valencian and Andalusian cases nicely illustrate two kinds of cultural policies -- broadly defined -- that can strengthen citizen identification with their new regional governments.

Although the medieval kingdom of Valencia generates little affect among current inhabitants, history provides cultural entrepreneurs and their political allies with sufficient materials to forge an incipient Valencian nationalism. The most important of these materials is the fact that a large number of people in areas close to the Mediterranean speak Valencian, a language whose structure and vocabulary are extremely close to that of Catalan. Those who have migrated to the relatively developed Valencian capital as well as residents of rural areas distant from the sea, however, speak only Castilian.[2] Builders of Valencian nationalism also stress the region's geographical and topological distinctiveness -- especially its proximity to the Mediterranean and favorable agricultural conditions -- as well as the fact that traditions of self-government have long been embodied in local councils which control the distribution of water resources. Valencian cultural policy, which includes the provision of bi-lingual education in most schools and the sponsorship of a wide range of activity manifesting regional popular culture, is clearly intended to promote nationalistic sentiment in the community.

Andalusian cultural policy is less far-reaching, in part because Castilian is the region's universal language and because Spanish culture incorporates many Andaluz customs. Widespread resentment against the region's economic backwardness as well as historic pride (the American empire was linked to Spain through Seville) are the principal materials that the leaders of the Autonomous Community are using to shape Andalusian consciousness on behalf of their political objectives.

It is quite easy for Andalusian officials to sensitize citizens throughout the region to their relative economic deprivation. Andalusia is one of the poorest areas in western Europe. This standing is a palpable reality for Andalusians, many of whom remain in contact with relatives and friends who have emigrated to Spain's economic capitals and to northern Europe.

In this milieu, the Socialist party -- which in 1982 achieved an absolute majority in the Andalusian parliament as well as in the national one -- is fostering a developmentalist ideology and political program. Poverty, illiteracy, disease, and unemployment are among the complex social problems whose desired amelioration is receiving prominence in the rhetoric and actions of the Junta de Andalucia. Socialism in Andalusia is said to mean structural change, and structural change means overcoming fundamental obstacles to the region's economic development.[3]

Despite limited financial resources, the Socialists appear to be using effectively the authority granted to the autonomous government. In education, for example, instructional programs are now under way to help reduce adult illiteracy (of the over 40 age group in Andalusia, 40 percent never attended school).[4] By tripling historic investment rates, the education department is striving to raise the number of

schools to the national average as quickly as possible. Some 85 percent of the youngest children are now able to attend pre-school programs. To encourage student attendance at elementary schools, a free lunch program has been introduced. As a final example, 27 centers are now operating to improve the professional skills of instructors and to provide them with new teaching materials.

High levels of commitment to educational improvement do not derive solely from the positive economic consequences likely to flow from greater literacy and other skills. Junta officials are well aware that the provision of social goods to the previously disenfranchised usually generates enduring political loyalties. Beyond these classic incentives for enhancing educational attainment are the opportunities schooling provides for political socialization. Values such as regional pride are being cultivated by the development and utilization of an extensive series of reading materials on Andalusian history. Less direct effects on regional political culture are being sought through the encouragement of citizen participation in local educational institutions. These and other techniques are being widely employed, it appears, to shape liberal-democratic (some critics would say socialist) norms in Andalusia.[5]

Another key element in the PSOE strategy in Andalusia is to design and carry out an effective, legal land reform. For a variety of reasons, including the social status (rather than economic) function of landownership, a considerable proportion of arable land in the region is not sufficiently cultivated. Importantly, the main principle that is being used to justify the land reform is the enhancement of economic efficiency. This principle influences the selection of properties to be

subjected to the reform. It is also reflected in the legal technique of expropriating the use of certain classes of undercultivated land -- the application of which forces landowners to rent designated sections to tenant farmers for a minimum term of 12 years. Under certain other condition, special taxes are applied so as to increase the costs landowners bear in underutilizing their properties. In only a limited range of cases is compensated expropriation employed to implement Andalusia's land reform. This overall strategy is not only less antagonistic towards the interests of landholders than the alternative of widespread expropriation; it also conserves scarce financial resources. At the same time, the land reform will likely benefit a significant number of rural Andalusians, whose anarchist forebears struggled, often violently, to secure a more just distribution of property rights in land.[6]

Stepping back now from these examples of concrete problem-solving in the new political order, let us briefly consider one of the fundamental challenges facing all seventeen Autonomous Communities: the creation of effective public administrations. The political officials of these communities are in the awkward position of wanting to chart their own courses in policy-making and management while knowing that they must proceed conservatively so as to provide the public services transferred to them at (or above) the levels that had been provided by the central administration. The precariousness of this situation induces autonomous political officials to rely heavily on the functionaries who have been transferred to the regional administrations in conjunction with the transfer of authority to provide specific public services, such as education and public health.

One problem created by the movement from a unitary to a quasi-federal state is that the transferred functionaries tend to retain many of the habits of thought and work that they acquired while part of the central administration. Molding the attitudes and incentives of these civil servants is often difficult for top officials in the autonomies, especially since most of the latter have little public management experience. Furthermore, the fact that most senior functionaries remain in Madrid means that regional authorities cannot directly benefit from the managerial and technical knowledge that the top functionaries have accumulated.

Administrative reformers in Valencia and Andalusia are struggling against the inertial forces that lead their respective autonomies to consider adopting the central administration's organization form: the system of corps or cuerpos. This system was instituted early in the century in order to mitigate the spoils system that had until then been used to staff the bureaucracy. Apart from stability, one advantage of the corps system is that entry standards are extremely tough. The social status accorded to those who pass the examinations and competitions has induced many highly capable individuals to seek admission into the most prestigious corps. Furthermore, since the compensation available to corps members is often based upon services rendered (for which the public pays fees), there is a certain direct inducement to bureaucratic productivity.

The reformers with whom I spoke believe that the corps system has outlived its usefulness as an organization form and, consequently, should not be adopted by their autonomies. They are instead proposing that job classification systems be adapted to local needs. Selection and

compensation under this system would be based upon standards that attach to the kind of work performed in specific job categories rather than to corps membership.[7] As of June, the proposed arrangements (which are similar to those employed in the United States) had yet to be approved by the Valencian and Andalusian parliaments.

Of the many obstacles to the successful development of the Spanish State of the Autonomies, perhaps the greatest is the scarcity of experienced public managers. Spain's administrative tradition was formed during political orders that were hostile to both democracy and autonomist sentiments. Its evolution during the Franco era was deeply influenced by doctrines of administrative law and by the lawyers who, it appears, continue to dominate important bureaucratic posts. The training provided to entering members of the general state corps by the National Institute of Public Administration (INAP), moreover, is significantly oriented by legalistic traditions. Although the work of creating the new constitutional order is essentially complete, few provisions are yet being made to build an administrative tradition that would support the new values whose promotion the Autonomous Communities make possible for Spain.

NOTES

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1. As stated in Article 2 of the 1978 Constitution.

2. Some interior sections of Valencia speak Castilian because they were colonized by Castile as part of the reconquest of Spain. The Moors were driven out of the coastal zones by the Crown of Aragon.

3. Interview with Juan Cano, Letrado Mayor, Parlamento de Andalucia, June 1985.

4. Interview with Juan Santaella Lopez, Viceconsejero de Education, Junta de Andalucia, June 1985.

5. During my interviews, I was frequently reminded that the Spanish people are currently enjoying the longest period of democratic rule in their history. Macropolitical democratic norms (e.g., belief in the new constitutional order) are strong. But micropolitical participative democratic norms are said to remain exceedingly weak. Educational policies that promote participative values are seen by many as necessary for a more complete "transition to democracy."

6. It is widely accepted by historians that the land question in Andalusia helped undermine the Second Republic. The current land reform might therefore be seen as a significant contribution of Spain's decentralized democracy to solving one of the country's most tenacious social problems. However, Juan Linz, in a private communication, cautions that research should not overlook land reform initiatives in Andalusia during the early Franco period.

7. It is possible, of course, that under the job classification system personnel will be selected more on the basis of patronage than on merit.

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