



Arxiu històric FUNDACIÓ JAUME BOFILL

Memòria del II Congrés Internacional de Filosofia per nens

Institut de Recerca per l'Ensenyament de la
Filosofia (IREF)

JUNY 1987

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MEMÒRIA DEL II CONGRÉS INTERNACIONAL DE FILOSOFIA PER NENS

Santa Cristina D'Aro, 15 - 19 de Juny del 1987.

Contingut:

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2. Horari del Congrés.
3. Temari de les Sessions de Treball.
4. Informe de les activitats realitzades.
5. Ponències presentades.
6. Dossier de premsa.

Barcelona, 29 de Juny del 1987.

Eulòlio Borda

IREF

INSTITUT DE RECERCA
PER L'ENSENYAMENT
DE LA FILOSOFIA.

LLISTA D'INSCRIPCIONS AL II CONGRES INTERNACIONAL DE FILOSOFIA PER NENS

1. Inmaculada AUBO (Professora de Filosofia I.B.)
2. Anna BAIGES (Professora de Filosofia I.B.)
3. Josep CARTANYA (Mestre i Professor de l'Escola de Magisteri de Girona)
4. Jordi FORNELLS (Professor de Filosofia I.B.)
5. Maria Pilar GARCIA (Professora de Filosofia I.B.)
6. Jordi GIRBAU (Professor de Filosofia I.B.)
7. Albert GRAU (Professor de Filosofia I. B.)
8. Joan HERVAS (Mestre)
9. Antoni JIMENEZ (Professor de Filosofia I.B. i Professor de E. Magisteri)
10. Ildefonso PALACIOS (Professor de l'Escola de Magisteri de Vitoria)
11. Paquita PASCUAL (Professora de Filosofia I.B.)
12. Ramón PERALTA (Professor de Filosofia I.B.)
13. Carme RIPOLL (Mestra)
14. Anna ROSELLO (Mestra)
15. Teresa SABORICH (Mestra)
16. Isabel SANTACATALINA (Professora de Filosofia I.B.)
17. Félix TORREALDAY (Director d'ikastola a Sant Sebastià)
18. Jordi FONTANALS (Estudiant de Psicologia)

ESTRANGERS:

- PORTUGAL: 1. Maria Zaza CARNEIRO DE MOURA
2. Ondina DE CARVALLO FERNANDES RIBEIRO
3. Maria da Conceição CONDE DA SILVA PEREIRA DE CARVALHO
4. Maria Teresa LEVY MARTINS
5. Ana Maria Do O DE MENDONÇA RAMOS DE OLIVEIRA
6. Ana Maria VIEIRA DE ALMEIDA
- SUECIA: 7. Bosse MALMHESTER
- E.U.A. : 8. Matthew LIPMAN

- MEMBRES DE L'ORGANITZACIO:
1. Eulàlia BOSCH (Professora de Filosofia I.B.)
 2. Josep CULLELL (Professor de Filosofia I.B.)
 3. Carme GIMENEZ (Professora de Filosofia I.B.)
 4. Irene DE PUIG (Professora de Filosofia I.B.)
 5. Josep Maria TERRICABRAS (Professor Filosofia del Col·legi Universitari de Girona).

HORARI PREVIST PEL CRONGRES

Dia 15:

- 10 h. : Conferència de premsa per informar sobre el Congrés, presentar els participants estrangers i anunciar les diferents activitats de la setmana.
- 12 h. : Obertura formal del Congrés que inclourà una presentació de l'IREF i una ponència del Dr. Lipman.
- 16-18: Primera Sessió de Seminari
- 18,30-19,30: Comunicacions de grups estrangers.

Dia 16:

- 10-13 : Segona Sessió de Seminari
- 16-17,30 : Tercera Sessió de Seminari
- 18-20 : Sessió Oberta a no-congressistes en la que es farà una discussió pública del contingut i objectius del projecte "Filosofia per Nens". Hi seràn especialment convidats professors de filosofia i gent vinculada al món de l'educació.

Dia 17:

- 10-13 : Quarta Sessió de Seminari
- 16-17,30 : Quinta Sessió de Seminari
- Vespre: Visita turística i Sopar

Dia 18:

- 10-13 : Sisena Sessió de Seminari
- 17-19 : Taula Rodona i Conclusions. A la Taula Rodona hi participaran : el Dr. Lipman, un membre de cadascun dels grups estrangers presents en el Congrés, un membre del Consell Assessor del projecte i un membre del grup dels patrocinadors. Moderació de la Taula: IREF.

Dia 19:

- 9-11 : Comunicacions sobre les experiències fetes durant el present curs escolar.
- 11-13 : Propostes.

II CONGRES INTERNACIONAL DE
FILOSOFIA PER NENS

Temari per les sessions del Seminari

Dia 15:	16-18 h.	Primera Sessió	Harry, Cap. 1
Dia 16:	10-11,30 h.	Segona Sessió, pt. 1	Harry, Cap. 5.
	11,30-13 h.	Segona Sessió, pt. 2	Harry, Cap 14, pt.1
	16-17,30 h.	Tercera Sessió	Harry, Cap. 17
Dia 17:	10-13 h.	Quarta Sessió	Pixie, Cap. 5 i 6
	16-17,30 h.	Quinta Sessió	Lisa, Cap. 1
Dia 18:	10-13 h.	Sexta Sessió	Suki, Cap. 5, Ep. 1

INFORME DEL II CONGRES INTERNACIONAL DE FILOSOFIA PER NENS

El II Congr s Internacional de Filosofia per Nens ha tingut lloc a Santa Cr stina D'Aro del 15 al 19 de Juny del 1987.

Les Sessions de treball del Congr s s'han realitzat d'acord amb l'horari i el temari acordats pr viament. Aix  doncs, hi ha hagut Sessions de Seminari, Comunicacions de grups estrangers, Sessions Obertes, Discussions sobre les dificultats d'experimentaci  registrades i Planejament del projectes pel curs vinent.

SESSIONS DE SEMINARI:

Reservades als congressistes, les sessions de seminari han aplegat una trentena de persones. Han constitu t el nucli central del Congr s. Totes elles han estat dirigides pel Dr. Lipman i han tingut dos nivells de treball diferenciats:

- a) D'una part, s'ha fet un rep s dels aspectes te rics que fonamenten el projecte "Filosofia per Nens", aix  com la vinculaci  d'aquest projecte amb l'ensenyament de la Hist ria de la Filosofia. Algunes de les pon ncies preparades pel Dr. Lipman han estat proposades a debat en aquestes sessions. Les discussions que han originat han perm s la construcci  d'un marc de comprensi  necessari per afrontar el treball pr ctic.
- b) D'altra part, s'han presentat diversos models d'aplicaci  del m tode. L'an lisi dels materials recopilats en els Manuals del Professor i els lligams entre aquest tipus d'exercicis i els que nosaltres estem acostumats a plantejar a les nostres classes han omplert bona part de l'horari de treball del seminari.

Es va gravar en video una sessi  de treball completa, que, al igual que els textos de les pon ncies, estar  a disposici  de mestres i professors interessats.

COMUNICACIONS DE GRUPS ESTRANGERS:

Aquest ha estat un capítol especialment rellevant per tots els assistents al Congrés. Ha mostrat la flexibilitat del projecte per adaptar-se a sistemes educatius diferents.

El Dr. Lipman va fer esment repetides vegades d'experiències realitzades a diferents llocs del món, algunes de les quals ens eren molt pròximes per raons lingüístiques (Amèrica Llatina) o culturals (Europa) i d'altres resultaven suggeridores per insòlites (Australia, Orient llunyà).

El Dr. Bosse Malmhøst, professor de filosofia a l'àrea metropolitana de Stockholm, que treballa des de fa dos anys en el programa de Filosofia per Nens des de l'assignatura de Llengua Sueca, va presentar la seva experiència en un text titulat: "Llibres per nens: Il·lustracions, Llenguatge i Filosofia per Nens".

El grup de professores portugueses assistent al Congrés varen presentar la seva experiència per mitjà d'una cinta de video gravada a l'escola "Cooperativa A Torre" durant una classe de Filosofia per Nens. La directora de l'escola, Ana Maria Vieira, va explicar les condicions i resultats d'aquella classe, fet que va permetre una llarga discussió sobre aspectes pràctics, de gran importància, especialment, pels mestres catalans que poden començar l'any vinent.

La Dra. Daniela Camhy, que malhauradament no va poder assistir al Congrés per un problema de salut, va fer-nos arribar la memòria del recent "Encontre de Filosofia per Nens" celebrat a Graz (Austria) a finals de Maig i organitzat pel Centre de Filosofia per Nens que ella dirigeix. Així mateix ens va fer a mans el text de la ponència "Preparar als mestres per ensenyar a pensar", elaborada conjuntament amb el Dr. Lipman i que pensava presentar personalment al Congrés.

La Dra. Patricia Sustrac, del Centre d'Orleans (França), que va participar en el I Congrés de Filosofia per Nens celebrat a Girona l'any 86, va fer-nos arribar també la relació d'activitats realitzades pel centre que dirigeix, IREPE, durant el curs 86-87.

SESSIONS OBERTES:

Al llarg del Congrés varem celebrar dues sessions obertes.

La primera anomenada així, Sessió Oberta, va aplegar unes seixanta persones provinents dels diferents àmbits del món de l'educació. Pretenia donar a conèixer els trets fonamentals del projecte i permetre la discussió entre professionals de les seves possibilitats a casa nostra.

La taula estava formada per: Dr. Lipman, Dra. Maria Teresa Levy, Dr. Bosse Malmhester, Dra. Pilar Garcia i, per l'IREF, la Sra. Eulàlia Bosch. La moderació va córrer a càrrec de la Sra. Carme Giménez, secretària de l'IREF.

Va obrir la Sessió el Dr. Lipman amb la seva ponència: " Pensar a l'escola".

La resta de membres de la taula van fer les seves intervencions entorn a l'interès que el projecte havia despertat en els respectius sistemes educatius.

El debat posterior va recollir alhora aspectes informatius i polèmics que donaven mostra de l'interès despertat per la sessió.

D'aquest acte se'n va fer una gravació en video.

La segona sessió oberta del Congrés va consistir en una Taula Rodona en la que hi intervingueren: el Dr. Lipman, el Dr. Portavella, Inspector de Filosofia i Membre del Comitè Assessor de l'IREF i el Dr. Terricabras, membre fundador de l'IREF i responsable de la traducció del material anglès. Va moderar l'acte el Sr. Josep Cullell, del Comitè Organitzador. El tema central de la Taula Rodona era discutir el paper que la Filosofia per Nens podia jugar en el futur de les nostres escoles. Així, després de la introducció feta pel Dr. Lipman sobre la importància del raonament a l'escola primària, el Dr. Portavella va analitzar les possibilitats que el programa tenia en el sí de la Reforma Educativa que prepara la Generalitat de Catalunya i el Dr. Terricabras va apuntar els canvis que podria suposar aquest programa en els professors i alumnes que l'adoptessin. La discussió que va seguir a les ponències presentades va delimitar amb força precisió el marc en que s'havien de formular les propostes pel següent curs .

L'acte es va cloure amb l'aprovació de les conclusions del Congrés, que figuren també en aquesta memòria.

DISCUSSIONS SOBRE LES DIFICULTATS D'EXPERIMENTACIÓ REGISTRADES:

Cal tenir present que aquest era el II Congrés que preparavem sobre el tema Filosofia per Nens. Això vol dir que part dels assistents havien estat presents ja l'any anterior al Congrés celebrat a Girona, del que n'havien sortit projectes concrets d'experimentació.

Així doncs, s'esqueia dedicar una sessió al debat de les dificultats sorgides al llarg de l'any. Aquesta feina no servia només als professors que portaven temps treballant en el projecte sino que permetia també als que hi entraven en contacte per primera vegada fer-se una idea més real del que podia donar de sí el programa.

La intervenció dels companys estrangers en aquesta sessió va ser també molt ben rebuda perquè mostrava els problemes comuns i les solucions diverses.

Van examinar-se amb gran atenció formes de presentació de textos, tipus d'exercicis idonis, nivells de participació, avaluacions... i van sorgir propostes concretes per resoldre alguns problemes ja detectats.

L'IREF, com a centre promotor de la Filosofia per Nens, va assumir ja responsabilitats concretes que asseguressin el caràcter acumulatiu i crític del control de l'experiència.

La sessió va ser dirigida per la Dra. Pilar Garcia, professora d'I.B. a la ciutat de València, que ja fa tres anys que treballa en el programa.

PROJECTES PEL CURS VINENT:

El matí del dia 19 es va dedicar a discutir i coordinar les experiències que es proposaven pel curs 87-88. El marc de discussió eren les conclusions aprovades la tarda anterior.

Mestres i professors d'institut varen plantejar les seves possibilitats i preferències i es varen dibuixar cinc modalitats diferents de treball en funció dels textos a utilitzar i dels alumnes als qui anirien dirigides.

Com a coordinador de cada grup d'experimentació hi haurà un membre de l'IREF. Durant aquest primer any s'acordà un seguiment bastant estricte dels diferents grups de treball així com fer un esforç per garantir el suport necessari a tots aquells professors que el demanessin: traduccions, material alternatiu, contactes amb altres mestres, accés a revistes i articles específics...

El pla de treball quedarà totalment perfilat a començaments de setembre, després del curs que l'IREF organitza a l'Escola d'Estiu de Girona. Aleshores ja es disposarà de traduccions definitives dels materials necessaris.

Al marge d'aquestes sessions generals, els diferents grups presents en el Congrés varen celebrar reunions privades de caràcter més monogràfic: organització, finançament, vinculació amb les institucions, enllaços internacionals, contactes i cursos de reciclatge a l'IAPC. ...

Així mateix, l'IREF va treballar a fons amb el Dr. Lipman les qüestions referents a traducció i adaptació dels textos dels que n'és autor.

VALORACIO

L'IREF valora molt positivament la celebració del II Congrés Internacional de Filosofia per Nens perquè ha permès:

1. Consolidar un grup de mestres y professors entorn al projecte Filosofia per Nens des del qual l'IREF se sent capaç de seguir impulsant aquest programa amb garanties suficients.
2. Establir una xarxa de relacions nacionals i internacionals suficientment estable que assegurí l'intercanvi permanent d'experiències en el marc d'aquest projecte.
3. Començar a preparar cursos de formació i reciclatge de professorat a partir de les necessitats reals ja expressades pels diferents grups que treballen en el projecte, dibuixant perspectives a curt i llarg termini que resultin coherents entre sí.
4. Obrir noves possibilitats de col.laboració interdisciplinària a instituts i escoles que ja fa temps treballen en aquest sentit.
5. Aprofundir els contactes amb les autoritats educatives en base a les experiències en marxa i a les ofertes i expectatives existents entre el professorat.

II CONGRÉS DE FILOSOFIA PER NENS

Els participants en el II Congrés de FILOSOFIA PER NENS, celebrat a Sta Cristina d'Aro, del 15 al 18 de juny de 1987, sota la direcció del Prof. Matthew Lipman, volem remarcar la importància d'aquest projecte a través de les següents conclusions:

1. Subratllem la gran aportació de la Filosofia per nens a la formació de ciutadans amb un pensament personal, sòlid i rigorós, i amb un tarannà crític, dialogant i democràtic. Això és molt important en la nostra època, quan el resorgiment de la filosofia com a disciplina humanística s'ha de potenciar amb seriositat i exigència.
2. Creiem que el diàleg -que la Filosofia per nens converteix en eix del seu mètode- ofereix un marc idoni per substituir la competitivitat escolar per la cooperació intel·lectual, i la creixent indiferència (o avorriment) de molts alumnes i professors per un estil de treball corresponsable i il·lusionat.
3. Valorem molt positivament el caràcter internacional d'aquest mètode que, a nosaltres, ens permet de retrobar-nos, a un nivell nou, amb la gran tradició filosòfica europea, conduïda sempre pel gran ideal de la recerca coratjosa i sincera de la veritat, la justícia i la cooperació.

Sta. Cristina d'Aro, 18 de juny de 1987

PONÈNCIES PRESENTADES AL II CONGRÉS DE FILOSOFIA PER NENS

L'IREF te el projecte d'editar els textos de les ponències presentades al II Congrés. Volem incloure en aquesta memòria la llista de títols per tal de posar-los a la disposició d'aquells que hi estiguin interessats de forma immediata.

1. Matthew Lipman: "Some Thoughts on the Foundations of Reflective Education".
2. Matthew Lipman: "The future of Critical Thinking"
3. M. Lipman and Daniela Camhy : "Preparing teachers to teach for Thinking"
4. Bosse Malmhester : "Children's Books: Pictures, Language and Philosophy for Children"
5. Josep Cullell : "Aprendre a pensar"
6. Memòria de la Conferència Internacional celebrada a Graz (Maig 87)
7. Bibliografia actualitzada sobre el programa "Filosofia per Nens".

Així mateix, comptem amb tres cintes de video:

1. Sessió de treball amb nens de 7 i 8 anys a l'escola "Cooperativa A Torre" de Lisboa. Dirigeix la classe la Dra. C. Young Silva, Directora del Centre de Filosofia per Nens de Sao Paulo (Brasil).
2. Sessió de treball amb professors i mestres al II Congrés Internacional de Filosofia per Nens de Santa Cristina D'Aro. Dirigeix la sessió el Dr. Lipman.
3. Sessió Oberta celebrada al II Congrés Internacional de Filosofia per Nens a Santa Cristina D'Aro. Intervenien: Dr. Lipman, Dra. Maria Teresa Levy, Dr. Bosse Malmhester, Dra. Pilar Garcia i, per l'IREF, Sra. Eulàlia Bosch. Hi es també recollit el debat posterior .

Some Thoughts on the Foundations
of Reflective Education

Matthew Lipman
Montclair State College

Pixie is a novel for children in grades K-4. It is a novel in that newest genre of children's literature, philosophy for children. Pixie's class is going on a zoo trip. They each have an assignment: to select a "mystery creature," look for it in the zoo, and then write a story about it. Pixie looks in vain for her secret creature in the zoo. She breaks down and cries. Only then do we discover that her mystery creature was a mammal. Her classmates explain to her that mammals aren't animals so much as they're classes of animals. They explain to her that the class of ducks can't fly and the class of redheads isn't itself redheaded. They also discuss the difference between class relationships and family relationships. The novel spends a good deal of time on the topic of relationships. But in any event, this is how it begins:

Now it's my turn. I had to wait so long for the others to tell their stories!

I'll start by telling you my name. My name is Pixie. Pixie's not my real name. My real name my father and mother gave me. Pixie's the name I gave myself.

How old am I? The same age you are.

After the children in the class—the live children, that is—have read the first episode (or have had it read to them), they are asked to say what they found in it that interested them. Those who can do so may formulate questions. Others may merely point to a sentence, or to a word. For example, someone may point to the phrase "my turn" in the first sentence. Another person may say, "real name." And someone else may ask, "How can Pixie be the same age we are, if we're not all of the same age?"

These comments then become the basis of class discussion, starting with the question of what it means to "take turns." It would not be unusual for a kindergartner to suggest that taking turns is a form of sharing. (It's a shrewd move nonetheless, finding the genus—in effect, generalizing—from a single instance.

Here the teacher might intervene with the question, "Can anyone tell me some other kinds of sharing?" One quickly hears about the sharing of rooms, of beds, of sandwiches. One may even hear, as a kindergarten teacher did recently, "My parents share me." By exploring the many meanings of the word share, by offering differently nuanced examples, the students gradually clarify for themselves the concept of sharing. They move from instantiation to concept-formation, and do so willingly because it helps them understand better the story they've just read.

They may move on to discussions of names, and even to what it is to be real. Here the teacher may offer an assignment (once the students have begun to distinguish between "things that are really real" and "things that only seem to be real".) The children are to bring some object to class the next day and put it in one of four boxes. The boxes, it will turn out, are labelled "things that seem real and are"; "things that seem real but aren't"; "things that don't seem real but are"; and "things that don't seem real and aren't". It's an exercise in elementary logic (and metaphysics), just as the previous discussion on sharing was an application of logic to an area of ethics.


Now there's a clamor about the problem of Pixie's age. Can Pixie actually be as old as we are? How can one person be many different ages? How can the one be many, or the many one? But someone in the class may suggest a way of resolving the mystery: Pixie may not be talking to us. She may be talking to a group of children her own age. This interpretation, of course, requires a drastic shift in one's frame of reference, in order to realize that Pixie may be talking to someone else rather than to us; to understand it may require an almost Copernican shift of perspective. Many children, of course, don't understand this interpretation or actively reject it, with the result that they continue to think of Pixie as having many ages, or as being ageless, so that, as one fourth-grader put it, "she has birthdays every day of the year."

The Pixie program is one of six programs that have been developed by the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children. Each program consists of a children's novel, usually about 100 pages in length, and a 400 page instructional manual crammed with exercises and discussion plans keyed to the concepts and skills in the novels. Two programs, Pixie and Kio and Gus, are for K-4. Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery is for grades 5-6, and plays a pivotal role in the entire series, since it introduces children to the principles of logic. The remaining three novels apply the reasoning skills developed earlier to specific academic areas. Lisa, which is used in grades 7-8, deals with ethical reasoning and moral practice. Thinking and writing are blended in the early high school program called Suki. And a reflective approach to social studies is to be found in the Mark program, suitable for later secondary school.

One of the governing ideas in a democracy, an idea that regulates both curriculum development and teacher preparation, is that reasonableness is perhaps the single most important characteristic of the educated person. Democracies are inclined to this view because they have found it difficult to function when their citizens are inclined to be unreasonable. On the other hand, many educators have found this view appealing, because it is conducive to the development of autonomous, rational beings. According to such educators, educated people are conspicuous by their thinking well, rather than that they are merely learned.

To shift priorities in education from learning to thinking requires, in effect, a redefinition of the function of the classroom. The classroom as presently constituted is a receptacle for students who are themselves receptacles of information. It must be transformed into an association of thinking children or, more properly, into a community of inquiry.

TRANSFORMING THE CLASSROOM INTO A COMMUNITY OF INQUIRY THROUGH PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN



Philosophy for Children can, of course, be viewed as merely another curriculum innovation aimed at improving children's thinking skills. Another way of looking at it, however, is to see it as a prototype of the new era in education which is just beginning. When it is thought of in this fashion, it invites being unpacked into its components, their sources and their modes of functioning in the program as a whole.

1. Disciplinary and methodological sources.

- (a) Formal and informal logics. The first novel to be written in the program was Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery, which draws upon the class logic of Aristotle (especially in the areas of conversion, contradiction and categorical syllogisms.) This logic is supplemented by the logic of relations (transitivity and symmetry) and by modern propositional logic (conditional syllogisms.) These deductive logics are reinforced by excursions into induction and informal logic.
- (b) Scientific inquiry. Chapter One of Harry represents a paradigm of the process of inquiry, much in the way Dewey (in How We Think) constructs such a paradigm to show the continuity between everyday problem-solving and scientific method. The stages of the process in the Harry chapter are: felt difficulty; doubt; defining the problem; forming a hypothesis; inferring possible consequences; discovery of a counter-instance; revising and broadening the hypothesis to explain the counter-instance; and application of the revised hypothesis to a life situation.
- (c) Philosophy. While it is true that Philosophy for Children in its entirety is derived from the academic discipline of philosophy (minus, of course, the names and dates of philosophers and their schools), certain aspects of traditional philosophy are highlighted in the children's version. One

such aspect, already mentioned, is logic. Another is the predilection philosophy has for fastening upon the problematic aspects of any discipline or form of knowledge and seeking to analyse and clarify the concepts to be found therein. Conceptual analysis is, of course, characteristic of virtually all schools of philosophy, even though modern Anglo-British philosophy has tended to favor it almost exclusively. In any event, philosophical analysis provides a regimen much needed by children who are much perplexed by muddled and contestable concepts, and need a set of tools for getting at their meanings. Needless to say, unpacking meanings draws upon the critical and interpretive functions of philosophy as much as it derives from its analytical functions.

- (d) Foreign languages and linguistics. It is possible to construe every academic discipline, from algebra to zoology, as a symbol-system or language. Once this assumption is made, it is possible to re-interpret the problem of transfer, and to recognize that translation is the bridge which enables us to transfer our meaning-acquisition operations from one linguistic context to another. Ordinarily there is no ready transfer from one discipline to another, just as there is no ready translation from one language to another—say, from Greek to English. But if students are equipped with translation skills, they can learn to carry meanings over from one language to another. Likewise, if students are provided with interdisciplinary, bridge-building skills, the establishment of continuities among the disciplines becomes much more feasible for them.
- (e) Literature. Normally, children are equipped with textbooks and readers. The readers contain stories that are supposed to invite reading. They are therefore easy to read and are wholly innocent of any cognitive content which might make it burdensome. Anything perplexing or prob-

lematic has been removed. Such stories can be read with the same passive fascination one accords to television cartoons. They may make for literacy, but it is a literacy devoid of intellectual stimulation. The disjunction between reading and thinking is firmly established at the earliest possible moment in the child's life. In reflective education (of which Philosophy for Children is an example), children are encouraged to read and write thoughtfully, just as they are encouraged to recognize the crucial role thinking plays in whatever we make or say or do.

Instead of a dichotomy, then, between secondary texts bulging with unappetizing, unpalatable and undigestible information on the one hand and vapid, vacuous reading materials on the other, it is possible to construct a literary genre in which the stories to be read reveal to children how thinking can be conducted so that the materials to be learned can be discovered by the children themselves. (If cognitive psychologists have emphasized anything, it is that "contextualized" information, i.e., information presented in story form, is more readily learned than de-contextualized information.) Moreover, such presentations reveal to children the model of the child as thinker. It is not surprising that, without such a model, children in the past have had a hard time taking their own thinking processes seriously and have discounted the value of their own thoughts, which might otherwise have seemed so precious to them.

Not only, then, does the literary vehicle provide a model of thinking children, but it serves to awaken (if awakening is needed) the mental life of the child. This is of vital importance, for if thinking is not taking place, it can hardly be improved. The sharpening

of thinking skills is not likely to be effective among children who are in a state of mental torpor. Something is needed to arouse their wonder and curiosity and inquisitiveness, and to give them practice in performing the cognitive acts which are prerequisites for the acquisition of cognitive skills. Thus to read a Sherlock Holmes "mystery" is to have our wonder and curiosity and inquisitiveness aroused; we find ourselves engaging in such mental acts as supposing, assuming, guessing and judging. When Holmes examines a footprint and tells Watson what sort of person it was who made such a footprint, we are impelled to re-enact Holmes's thought processes, for only by going through his reasonings can we explain his conclusions to ourselves. If Holmes tells us that the man who made that footprint must have weighed 200 pounds, we cannot help asking ourselves what such a footprint must look like, to be able to infer from it the weight of the man who made it.

When children discuss what they have just read, they in effect reconstruct the thinking that went into the writing of what they have read; even though such discussions may not disclose the writer's intentions, they disclose his or her meanings. This combination of thinking, reading and meaning can be serviceable again when the same children must engage in writing, and discover that it too is inseparable from thinking and meaning.

- (f) Cognitive psychology. From cognitive psychology and from the philosophy of mind comes the analysis of mental activity into a continuum of affective states, affective-cognitive states, cognitive states, cognitive states/acts and cognitive (as well as metacognitive) acts. It is generally taken for granted that mental states cannot be conveyed by teaching; whether the same is true in the case of mental acts is more controversial.

(g) Dialogical practice and educational theory. From the time of Socrates, dialogue has been recognized as an important way of structuring educational interactions. Socratic dialogue, in which the teacher helps the learner bring to light what he apparently already knows, and in which both teacher and student explore and discover together, has been a particularly interesting dialogical procedure. Nevertheless, Deweyan educational theory is no less important in this regard, since Dewey stresses the educational value of students' reflecting upon — discussing, analysing and interpreting — their own experience. From this it follows that without such experience directly available to them, classroom discussions will be impoverished. All the more reason, then, to begin each class session with an experience in which aesthetic and scientific, cognitive and affective strands are deliberately knotted together, and to urge the students immediately thereafter to unravel these strands and examine them individually, as well as in the the relationships they have to one another. Such discussions are far from being idle chatter. They are the work of intelligence, and the process by means of which cognitive skills are most effectively sharpened.

2. Cognitive skills.

(a) Reasoning skills. Virtually any taxonomic approach to cognitive skills is bound to be problematic, and efforts to simplify matters tend to be arbitrary. On the whole, it is advisable to avoid hierarchical approaches—one of the more obvious difficulties with Bloom's taxonomy. Another danger results from being too selective. This too is illustrated by Bloom, who virtually ignores the skills needed for deductive reasoning.

Now, there are a great many kinds of thinking: anything we do intentionally or deliberately involves thinking. However, when criteria which thinking must conform to are established—such as the logical criteria which enables us to distinguish valid from invalid reasoning—then the thinking that takes place is called reasoning. This may seem to suggest that all reasoning is rule-governed, but this may be an overly-restrictive interpretation. When we reason deductively, our reasoning is rule-governed, but we are still reasoning when, discovering our deductions to have been invalid, or our premises to have been shaky, we go back and review our premises and the format of our inferences. Indeed, we are still reasoning when we reason inventively. We are not, in such cases, actively guided by rules, although it may subsequently be found that the way we thought can be expressed by rules.

Obviously there can be many kinds of reasoning: mathematical, symbolic, geometrical, linguistic and so on. From the point of view of those who measure intelligence, all of these are potentially of equal worth, and no one could be said to lack intelligence who had any one but not the others. From the point of view of educational design, however, it is clear that the language of the American classroom is the English language: it is that language in which books are written, discussions are held, and tests are phrased. Those who propose to engage in thinking skill improvement must keep this fact clearly in mind.

The distinction is often made between "elementary" and "higher order" cognitive skills, although the grounds for such a distinction are seldom disclosed. For our present purposes, such a distinction can be useful

nevertheless. We can think of elementary cognitive skills as those involving a single reasoning step, while the higher-order skills involve the making of several such steps. (The distinction is particularly useful in testing, since it is more difficult to pinpoint weaknesses in multiple-step items than in single-step items.)

There is thus a broad sense in which anything that is a skill involves reasoning. There is a narrower sense in which all elementary and higher-order cognitive skills may be called reasoning skills. And there is a still narrower sense in which reasoning proper involves the use of single-step cognitive skills, so that they alone are called "reasoning skills", while inquiry skills, concept-analysis skills and translation skills are all higher-order cognitive skills. (It is not unusual for terms to have genus-species ambiguity: think of terms like "society" and "art," for example.) If, then, "thinking" is too vague a term for general usage, "reasoning" tends to have too many closely associated and hard-to-distinguish meanings. Under the circumstances, those who speak of "reasoning" at any length find it difficult to avoid being equivocal.

Still, we can find paradigms which provide relatively clear-cut cases against which we can measure the cases which blend into one another. Thus examples of single-step reasoning moves might be found in such logical operations as conversion, contradiction, transitivity and symmetry, while multiple-step reasoning might be exemplified by working out a contraposition or by constructing an analogy based on a counterfactual conditional.

Certainly it would be well to see cognitive skills as forming a continuum ranging from the simple to the complex, depending upon the number of operations involved. Thus very elementary mental acts

such as guessing and surmising are necessary for hypothesis-construction; hypothesis-construction permits one to engage in reasoning with conditional syllogisms; such reasoning, in turn, plays an important role in problem-solving and other aspects of inquiry.

- (b) Inquiry skills. The prosecution of scientific inquiry compels the mobilisation of internally-diversified clusters of skills, as has just been noted. If we were to examine explanation, description, evaluation, verification, falsification, observation or any other inquiry skills, we would find them composed of teams of skills in disciplined cooperation. Reluctance to decompose inquiry skills into their components does not make for effective pedagogy in science education, for the lack of proficiency in a complex skill is often the fault of a malfunctioning component skill. If we cannot decompose complex skills into component functions, remediation where indicated may become difficult to achieve.
- (c) Concept-analysis skills. The simplest skills are often the most fundamental. The best examples are making connections and making distinctions. Without competence in these two areas, one's hopes for more general cognitive competence must be dim indeed. On the other hand, once one is able to make reliable distinctions and connections, one can begin to group, to classify and to define.

Students are often eager to explore the boundaries of a concept—the edges of its meaning. This can be done by assembling roughly synonymous terms to constitute the central meaning of the concept, while also assembling the antonyms to establish the outer boundaries. One is then left with an intervening twilight zone or no-man's-land inhabited by fuzzy terms and blurry meanings. However it is precisely these, rather than the clear-cut cases, that are the most interesting to examine and are most likely to give rise to classroom discussion.

- (d) Translation skills. It is often said, and with good reason, that proficient readers are those who comprehend what a passage states, implies and assumes, who can interpret the passage both sympathetically and critically, and who can apply its meanings to relevant life situations. Fostering the skills of application and critical interpretation is best achieved through discussion of the passage in question, in the context of a classroom community of inquiry. It is in such a community, in such a dialogue, that appreciation is developed for the variety of possible interpretations, points of view and perspectives, and that relevant applications can be tried out under the watchful eyes of one's peers.

On the other hand, there are the hard cognitive skills which must come to grips with what a passage states, implies and assumes. Obviously this means assumption-finding and inferential skills. But more is involved, if one is to get at what the passage actually states. To grasp what a difficult expository passage means is to translate it into language one is more comfortable with—to paraphrase it into a more colloquial, but still nearly synonymous version. Now translation is, in a sense, the counterpart of inference: inference preserves truth regardless of meaning, while translation preserves meaning regardless of truth. The two work together as do the left hand and the right hand. The reasoning skills most directly involved in translation are analogical reasoning (indispensable for comparing the original passage with inexact paraphrases of it) and logical standardization (valuable for showing how rules can be constructed to govern translation from general linguistic usages into the specialized locutions of classical logic.)

3. Mental Activity

Here we have a continuum that ranges from affective states with only a germ of cognitive activity to cognitive acts with only a mild

affective tinge. These affective states may be rudely appetitive (craving, desiring); they may accompany weak or strong preferences (liking, disliking, loving, hating, fearing, dreading); they may anticipate action (intending, willing, determining); or they may be related to one's understanding or lack of understanding of the world (wondering, believing, admiring, respecting, hoping, expecting.) Some of these may pass over into combinations of states and acts, becoming more heavily weighted on the cognitive rather than the affective side (doubting, knowing, understanding).

When we come to cognitive acts, we can distinguish those that are verbalized from those that are not. Verbal acts are, of course, legion, and can be exemplified by telling, uttering, hinting, claiming, saying, insisting and asserting. Unverbalized cognitive acts (sometimes just called "mental acts") include supposing, assuming, surmising, remembering, judging, deciding, comparing and associating. A special sub-category of unverbalized cognitive acts are metacognitive acts, in which we think about thinking (our own or anyone else's). Metacognitive acts are important to cultivate, because they provide that impulse to self-correction which is essential to a community of inquiry.

4. Dispositions.

Attitudes and dispositions are responses to the quality of the social interaction prevalent in the group situation in which one finds oneself. One either internalizes the quality or develops negative attitudes towards it. In a classroom in which there is intellectual cooperation and intellectual criticism, the lively demanding of reasons for opinions and of explanations for puzzling events, the quest for meanings and the exploration of alternatives, children are motivated

to wonder, to inquire, to be critical, to be inventive and to care for and love the tools and procedures of inquiry. They acquire—or perhaps they re-acquire—a need for principles, ideals, reasons and explanations. Without such dispositions, children lack the readiness for sustained cognitive practice, and yet it is only such practice which gradually adds to the readiness.

The future of critical thinking

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Critical thinking is in vogue—in the colleges and universities as well as in the schools. Even if nothing else about this phenomenon were unusual, this would certainly stand out distinctly and pronouncedly. (Seldom do changes in academic fashion impact upon all classrooms simultaneously.) This is a thumbnail sketch of the movement: where it comes from, the social vectors that have helped produce it, the prevalent dichotomies which characterize it, the problems and trends that are presently discernible, and the portents which are suggestive for its future.

I. Historical background

What was the first American work in critical thinking, as distinguished from works in formal philosophy? A defensible answer might be Josiah Royce's Primer of Logical Analysis for the Use of Composition Students, which apparently fell still-born from the press in 1881. Apparently Royce was drawing upon the work of the German logician Sigwart and the British logicians Boole and Venn. In any event, what he produced, apart from its musty examples, was as fine a text in critical thinking as any that has been produced to this day. (The book is now a rarity.)

Scarcely more than twenty years later, there appeared John Dewey's epochal The Child and the Curriculum (1902) and How We Think (1903, 1933). The latter remains, rightly, the single most influential work in the field, but the former, in some ways more penetrating, provided a vision of the reconstruction in education which critical thinking might help bring about. It was perhaps the lack of this critical thinking component which guaranteed the ineffectiveness of the progressive education movement.

Nevertheless there was, as we know, a revival of sorts of the Deweyan ideal of education as democratic inquiry in the reflective teaching movement of the 1950's, under the leadership of Ernest Bayles, H. Gordon Hullfish, Lawrence Metcalf and others. Unfortunately reflective teaching alone, creditable as it may be, does not reflective education make.

These developments of the 1950's passed over into the stirrings of critical thinking which were more readily identifiable as such in the 1960's. Especially worthy of mention are B. O. Smith, Robert Ennis, Louis Rath and John Passmore. Texts of pivotal importance were produced by Max Black (Critical Thinking) and Monroe Beardsley (Practical Logic). At the same time, on a more theoretical level, there were the splendid essays of Gilbert Ryle on thinking and education, such as his "Thinking and Self-Teaching."

Over the past few decades, the general rubric of "critical thinking" has been used to indicate a point of convergence of many different disciplines and traditions, all of them emptying, like streams and rivulets, into a river of considerably greater breadth than depth. Some of these can be mentioned here, along with the names of some typical or exemplary representatives. Thus, from the field of education, one recalls the emphasis on thinking of Dewey, Seymour Sarason and Israel Scheffler, the stress on thinking skills of Hilda Taba, Benjamin Bloom and, more recently, Reuven Feuerstein, and the development by Peirce's conception of a "community of inquiry" by Joseph Schwab and Paolo Freire.

Because critical thinking is frequently taught by discussion rather than by lecture, we should not forget the dialogue tradition, as represented by Martin Buber, G. H. Mead, Bochenski, P. T. Geach and Ruth Saw, or the scholarship in the oral tradition by Walter Ong.

In science and mathematics education, there has been the important work of Polya, of Roger Osborne and Merlin Wittrock, and more recently, of Lenore Resnick, Jack Lochhead, Arthur Whimbey and Michael Martin.

An increasingly powerful impact is to be found in current work in linguistics, especially in the work of those, like George Lakoff and James McCawley, who are as much at home in logic and philosophy as they are in linguistics proper. The work of Johnson-Laird can be mentioned in this connection as well as relation to artificial intelligence, which also includes such figures as Ray Nickerson and Allan Collins. Johnson-Laird's work also reaches into the psychology of reasoning, in which significant work has also been done by Wason and Braine.

Of course, contributions to the emergence of critical thinking have come from any number of sub-disciplines of psychology, in some cases very directly and positively, as in the work of Reuven Feuerstein and Robert Sternberg, and in other cases more circuitously, as in the writings of Lev Vygotsky and Jerome Bruner. Certainly critical thinking among the young has been enormously facilitated by those revisionist critiques of the earlier works of Piaget which took a dim view of the child's capacity to handle abstract ideas. One might mention here the sterling analyses by Margaret Donaldson, John Macnamara and Susan Carey.

Mention must be made to of the many contributions from fields such as English and rhetoric which neighbor on linguistics on the one hand and philosophy on the other. I am thinking of Chaim Perelman's work, of Richard Ohmann's and Roger Brown's. But there are, obviously, many, many more from these fields.

Finally, there is philosophy, with its vast tradition stretching back to that greatest critical thinker of them all, Socrates, and reaching a vast number of familiar names along the way (such as Descartes and Spinoza) as well as lesser known but highly influential individuals such as Parmis. And can we really neglect all those treatises on "The Art of Thinking" that are sprinkled through the French (and to some extent the British—recall Graham Wallas) philosophical tradition? Can we really ignore the impact of Diderot's Great Encyclopedia, or of the "unmaskers" of ideological distortion in the German tradition—Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche? Even if we limit ourselves to 20th century philosophy, we can hardly pass over without mention the influence of ordinary language philosophy—especially that of Wittgenstein, Austin and Ryle. Mention must be made too of the persistence of the Socratic influence in Leonard Nelson and Bochenski and Collingwood, the continuation of dialectical analyses in Mannheim, Habermas, Kenneth Boulding and Richard Paul, the efforts to apply philosophy to problems of ^{ordinary life and} the professions, as visible in some of the work of Hare, Gorovitz, Peter Singer and Tom Regan, the emergence of informal logic in the writings of Toulmin, Scriven, Kahane, Ralph Johnson and Tony Blair, and the scrupulous examinations of children's conversation and literature for children by Gareth Matthews. Nor should critiques of critical thinking be omitted, such as the trenchant one by John McPeck.

I suspect that many of the above influences will be rediscovered, translated for teachers and students, in the novels and instructional manuals of the Philosophy for Children curriculum, which incorporates many more traditional philosophical influences as well. If there are to be better curricula in critical thinking, however, it is likely that they will more successfully build upon or incorporate the pioneering efforts just cited.

II. Why Critical Thinking Now?: Some Social Vectors

These are some of the social factors whose interaction may to some extent account for the present groundswell of interest in critical thinking:

1. Historical. Max Weber has portrayed historical development as a steady growth of legal-bureaucratic rationality, interrupted at times, even cataclysmically, by regressions to more traditional, charismatic or apocalyptic forms of life. This rise of rationalization (not in the Freudian sense) eliminates special authorities in favor of universal cognitive competence, which is seen as the next step after universal literacy, and substitutes a single world culture, logically interlocking and without respect for national boundaries, in place of a diversified and pluralistic world of nations. The ironical undertone of this portrait should not be missed, for it represents the rise of critical thinking as fostered by the same forces as look toward a future world order of monolithic rationality.

2. Economic. A generation ago, Norbert Wiener, in Cybernetics, predicted the competition likely to develop between the human brain and the computer, with the computer replacing the brain as the machine had replaced the human hand in the Industrial Revolution. What we are now witnessing is a growing recognition that we must not merely prepare people to work for a living, but to think for a living, and that if they're not prepared by us to think, they may not be able to find an occupation that will support them. Hence the growing burden to society of supporting those we have failed to teach thinking.

3. Political. Fledgling democracies like Brazil and Argentina have vast numbers of young children, but only precarious political stability. A great many of these children drop out of school after a few years. They are likely to grow up uncritical, apathetic, and ready prey to the first demagogue who comes along. The only hope, then, is to catch them in the few years they spend in school, and to plant in them the seeds of critical reflection. Repeat: the only hope.

At the same time, there has been a growing discontent among these who have

traditionally defended liberal education in a liberal society, for they have come to see the ideals of liberal society (e.g., the isolated individual voting as his or her conscience dictates in the isolation of the polling booth) as hardly adequate for the goals of liberal education. Thus such writers as Sheldon Wolin and Benjamin Barber, building on Dewey, stress the need for participatory, communitarian democracy rather than a mass democracy composed of aggregations of alienated individuals. The implications for education are that the traditional classroom, with its teacher-in-authority and its docile students taking notes, must give way to the classroom as a community of inquiry, and to the school as the shaper rather than the product of society.

4. Educational. The surfacing of the demand that education be "relevant" has not turned out to be a momentary fad. It can be treated as one, of course, in which case schooling becomes nothing more than training in trivia. But if the demand is understood, rather, as: "No more irrelevant knowledge: teach us how to think, and how to think for ourselves!" it represents a serious indictment of much of contemporary education, and sets a high but achievable standard for the future.

III. Prevalent differences of emphasis or approach

A casual survey of the contemporary scene, with regard to the critical thinking movement, is likely to turn up a number of differences—or even dichotomies—with regard to emphasis or approach. Here are some of them:

1. Disagreements over the nature of thinking

a. Those who see thinking as primarily problem-solving (sciences)
vs.

Those who see thinking as primarily problem-seeking (philosophy)
(stress on the problematic vs. the settled aspects of knowledge)

- b. Approaches which see the objective of critical thinking as involving the attainment of better-founded beliefs (Ennis)

vs.

Approaches which stress the process of critical inquiry, and hold that beliefs are merely temporary terminations of inquiry

- c. Approaches which contend that critical and creative thinking are opposed

vs.

Approaches which see critical and creative thinking as merely two sides of the same coin.

- d. Those who conceive the problem to be getting students to think

vs.

Those who concede that students already think, but need to think better

- e. Those who attempt to rank various thinking operations hierarchically (Bloom)

vs.

Those who argue that emphasis on one operation rather than another can only be determined by a given context or situation.

- f. Those who argue that the concrete must always be given priority over the abstract in teaching for thinking

vs.

Those who argue that thinking at any age involves the interpenetration of abstract and concrete, theory and practice, so that deferring the introduction of ideas to stimulate thinking can only lead to disastrous consequences.

2. Differences over the proper psychological approach

- a. Those who attempt to understand children's cognitive development by studying what children can't do without intervention (Piagetians)

vs.

Those who attempt to understand such development by studying what children can do with intervention

- b. Those who stress the varieties of human intelligence (mathematical, musical, linguistic, etc.) and want to cultivate all varieties

vs.

Those who see language as central to education, and as indispensable even to development of such proficiencies as calculation. The stress here is therefore on linguistic thinking.

3. Disagreements over the role of philosophy

- a. Those who emphasize either formal logic or informal logic or rhetoric.

vs.

Those who try to achieve a balance among these.

- b. Those who feel that philosophy has resources for the teaching of critical thinking which other disciplines lack, or see philosophy as good thinking,

vs.

Those who perceive philosophy as having no special expertise with regard to critical thinking, or perhaps as having no expertise at all.

- c. Those who believe that we will learn how thinking ought to occur only after we study how it does occur, and therefore stress descriptive research,

vs.

from
Those who believe that/no amount of factual information about how thinking does occur can inferences be validly drawn as to how thinking ought to occur, and who therefore stress normative intervention.

- d. Those who contend that the relationship between philosophy and thinking is analogous to the relationship between literature and writing

vs.

Those who contend that the only model for good thinking is the scientific model

4. Disagreements over preferential educational approaches

- a. Those who see critical thinking as involving generic skills which are not taught in traditional disciplines (Ennis)

vs.

Those who claim that thinking is sui generis in each discipline (McPeck)

- b. Those who attempt to promote thinking in the disciplines by plugging thinking skills directly into each discipline (Beyer)

vs.

Those who aim at strengthening the thinking of young children both in terms of specific skills and in the orchestration of those skills, ^{no matter in what context they may find themselves} so that the children themselves will carry this cognitive readiness into each classroom they enter.

- c. Those who believe critical thinking courses should consist in doing (e.g. practicing) critical thinking

vs.

Those who believe such courses should consist primarily in learning about critical thinking, such as in reading articles about it.

- d. Those who believe that the materials and instruction in critical thinking ^{ideal} courses should model the/thinking process, and should be rationally organized,

vs.

Those who believe that such materials and instruction ~~can be the same~~ as the materials and instruction in any other course.

- e. Those who despise what they call "packaged programs" consisting of books, manuals and systematic teacher-training to use these materials

vs.

Those who defend the use of such educational approaches

- f. Those who see critical thinking as best fostered by argument-analysis and practice in rhetorical techniques

vs.

Those who stress converting the classroom into a community of shared, cooperative, cognitive inquiry.

- g. Those who believe that courses in critical thinking can be only as good as the thinking that goes into them, and therefore insist that curriculum materials be prepared only by professionals in the area of critical thinking

vs.

Those who feel teachers should be involved in curriculum development, and can relate it better to the minds and lives of children.

- h. Those who stress paper-and-pencil exercises and homework

vs.

Those who stress conversation and dialogue to sharpen thinking

- i. Those who emphasize educating teachers to teach any critical thinking program

vs

Those who encourage teachers to commit themselves to a particular approach and be trained strenuously in it.

- j. Those who desire experimental research, with pre-post testing and control groups, as a way of distinguishing less effective and more effective ways of teaching for thinking

vs.

Those who are indifferent to such experimentation.

III. Present trends and problems

Trend 1. We are beginning to see experimentation with a variety of critical thinking course formats, with pre- and post-testing of comparable students. In addition to looking for significant improvement on reasoning, mathematics, reading and writing tests, examiners are beginning to assess a broad array of outcomes, such as grade point averages, quality point averages and SAT performances, to determine which courses, if any, contribute to significant improvement as measured by such outcomes.

Trend 2. Colleges are beginning to make it part of their mission to establish their faculty and staff as a "critical thinking community." Pioneer faculty members are revamping their courses to make them more productive of better student thinking. These courses are then studied by other faculty members, and the process is emulated successively by a widening circle of faculty groups. Such a breeder process requires some infusion of funding in order to work.

Trend 3. The mandating of critical thinking courses in the California State University system, at all of its campuses, and the testing for critical thinking skills in California elementary schools has undoubtedly had an impact in the rest of the country, but it is too soon to say that it has established a trend. People would like some evidence of effectiveness before following suit.

Trend 4. With the mushrooming of critical thinking courses on the campus comes the attendant problem of the worth of such courses when taught by non-philosophers, or non-humanists, as well as the worth of such courses when taught superficially by philosophers. If critical thinking courses are viewed by those who teach them as having only remedial value at best, and as having little or no academic integrity, their chances of being even of remedial value are severely compromised.

Trend 5. Some administrators, as Phil Pecorino has noted, are urging that existing humanities courses be converted into critical thinking courses, rather than be supplemented by critical thinking courses. This has the danger of depleting humanities offerings and impoverishing educational opportunities.

Trend 6. It is becoming fashionable on campus to hold symposia in which faculty members explain how they teach for thinking, although there is little evidence that they are teaching any differently now than they used to. Just as commodities are marketed better when the word "new" appears on the package, so courses are marketed better when the word "thinking" appears in the course description.

Problem 1. We are beginning to see how the road divides ahead of us with regard to education at all levels. Either we construct a rational curriculum and liberate the intellectual powers of the child to reach up to and seek to emulate that rationality, or we dumb down the curriculum to conform to the student's mind at its most sluggish or mediocre. It is not that the curriculum should be a Procrustean bed to which we should make the child conform. It is that the casual behavior of the child should not be a Procrustean bed to which we make the curriculum conform. We cannot improve thinking by means of reading materials that are sterile and insipid, mediated by teachers who lack intellectual curiosity, and who have been trained by professors whose only concession to teaching for thinking has been to insert the word "thinking" into the titles of all their courses.

Problem 2. A second problem is again a pedagogical one. Either we begin by making tables of terms, taxonomies of skills, lists of critical thinking references and so on, or we begin by dramatizing to the student what it is to be a thinker and what it is for there to be a community of intellectual inquiry, so that students can identify with these conceptions and begin to picture themselves as thinkers. Once they do, we're halfway there. Until they do, all the tables and taxonomies in the world won't be of much help.

Problem 3. By and large, critical thinking curriculum materials presuppose the existence in the student of the very skills and motivations which the critical thinking course has been designed to inculcate. Anyone who has the skills and motivation needed to follow the course doesn't really need the course. There are, fortunately, exceptions to this generalization. But of all the problems on the current scene, this may be the most serious.

IV. Some longer-range forecasts

1. I think a key problem is that of the quality of college instruction. Unless professors teach for thinking, the teachers they train will not do so, and the children taught by such teachers will not be induced to do so. But I doubt that the quality of college instruction is likely to improve very much until a significant proportion of students with improved reasoning skills begins to hit the campuses and force instructional quality upward. This is not quite the chicken-egg paradox it seems to be.

2. There will continue to be an enrichment of critical thinking content by infusion of materials and concepts from linguistics, informal logic, applied philosophy, artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology and related disciplines or subdisciplines.

3. Either critical thinking will die out because it is found to be too superficial, or too lacking in demonstrable educational impact, or it will continue to acquire greater depth and substance and move in the direction of becoming a legitimate discipline on its own, and reading and writing have done. It might even bring about a merger, eventually, with reading and writing, so as to form an even more fundamental level of educational practice.

4. Colleges are beginning to engage in more careful needs assessment. In the future, they may begin to examine the nature of students' tasks so as to determine the proportion of student time needed for linguistic as contrasted with non-linguistic forms of intelligence. They will also try to learn if non-linguistic proficiency presupposes linguistic proficiency.

5. To some extent, existing disciplines are absorbing some of the content of critical thinking: for example, by emphasizing that students distinguish "fact from opinion," or that students be able to classify informal fallacies. The problem is that these are the very things which are virtually obsolete as a result of the drastic revisionism of contemporary informal logic.

6. It is conceivable that critical thinking courses could become fixated on college campuses with no great increase in depth or complexity. Such courses could conceivably salve the consciences of educators with respect to the inadequacies of their educational offerings generally. They would be the homage vice pays to virtue.

7. It is likely that the problematic relationship between philosophy and critical thinking will deepen. Within philosophy itself, there are those who are diffident towards critical thinking, or willing to treat it to nothing more than benign neglect, as opposed to those who are enthusiastic about it. This quarrel among philosophers is in turn a reflection of the long-standing dispute among philosophers as to whether philosophy itself is one or many: whether it has one true nature, or is a collection or family of many cognate inquiries.

8. Increasingly, the role and function of philosophy on the college campus will be studied by elementary and secondary school educators, to determine if a similar institution is needed at the earlier levels of education. It must be remembered that elementary and secondary school education do not have the tradition of academic freedom that characterizes the college and university, so that the presence of philosophy, which is a kind of emblem of that freedom, is ^{no} more than a superficial novelty when it appears in the schools. Further, philosophy in college provides a campus-wide clearing-house of ideas, and such a thing is sorely needed in earlier education. All of which goes to prove that philosophy is the one course to have if you're having more than one.

9. As it is presently constituted, and even in terms of its foreseeable future, critical thinking is not going to perform any educational miracles. It cannot provide the momentum which would compel each and every discipline to become

reflective and self-critical. (I suspect that when a discipline reflects upon and becomes self-critical of itself, it becomes the philosophy of itself.) Education today, in the colleges as well as in the schools, is all bricks and no mortar. The cement that would hold everything together can be provided by the logical, epistemological, ethical and aesthetic considerations that must be drawn from philosophy, so that the close-knit warp and woof of the educational texture can be brought into being, something like this:

	Science	Social Studies	Art	Phys Ed	Health	History	English
Logic	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Epistemology	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Aesthetics	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ethics	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Metaphysics	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Phil. of Ed.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

10. I remain, therefore, an unrepentant defender of philosophy as the way to go if critical thinking is to have a future. In the process of remaking education, we may have to remake philosophy, but both forms of reconstruction are long overdue.

PREPARING TEACHERS TO TEACH FOR THINKING

M. Lipman

D. Camhy

If grade-school philosophy has an Achilles heel, it would seem to be in the area of teacher preparation. The construction of curriculum materials for children is not an obstacle, for the primary sources already exist in the form of the basic writings of the philosophical tradition. All that is needed is their translation into a form suitable for children, and it has been amply demonstrated that this can be done successfully. But what about teacher education?

The teaching of philosophy requires teachers who are highly sensitive to ideas, to the exploratory nature of dialogical inquiry, and to the humanity of the children being taught. Present modes of teacher preparation are not conspicuously noteworthy for developing these teacher dispositions. Indeed, it may well be the case that the only teachers who fully possess these dispositions are those who brought them half-formed to the schools of education they attended. And indeed, it has been the experience of those who have worked in the area of teacher education in philosophy for children that there is little difficulty in working with teachers who are already "half-way there"; much more difficult are those would-be teachers who are little inclined to enjoy free-wheeling intellectual discussions and who do not suffer gladly children's tentative, unsophisticated and uninhibited explorations of their mortal lot. On the other hand, the very existence of grade-school philosophy exercises a magnetic attraction for those who do possess the necessary dispositions but who would not ordinarily have considered elementary school teaching within the range of their career alternatives. Needless to say, the accomplishment of a turnover in the field of teacher applicants in which the trickle of those with intellectual sparkle and vitality swells to a steady flow is likely to be the result of a long and arduous process of reform in teacher education, along with the steady growth of grade-school philosophy as the ever-present incentive. But it can be done and it will have to be done if those who presently teach for rote learning are to be replaced by those who teach for active, energetic and excellent thinking.

It has already been mentioned that the problem of curriculum development in grade-school philosophy is to translate traditional philosophical works into materials children can readily understand and discuss. The problem of translation is also at the heart of the teacher education process. Professors of education tend to employ a restricted gamut of teaching styles. At one extreme, they lecture in their own language, and the would-be teachers must devote themselves assiduously to trying to understand what is being said in that language. At the other extreme, professors of education speak the language of the teacher (which they somehow assume to be the language of the classroom.) Seldom do professors of education attempt to educate teachers in the same language as teachers are compelled to employ in educating children. Their failure to do so places the entire burden of translation upon the teacher, but they provide the teacher with few clues as to how it is to be done. The teachers do the best they can: they do what they have been trained to do—they teach as they have been taught. This then places the burden of translation upon the child, who must not only struggle to understand what is being taught, but must first translate it from some unknown scholarly language into his own.

The only way to avoid this exercise in futility is for professors of education to translate the contents of their disciplines into the language of the classroom, and then, using that language, educate candidates for teacher certification in the same language and using the same pedagogical methods as those teachers will later employ themselves with children. Such an overhaul is a big order, obviously, but if it entails junking the lecture method, except for certain specialized purposes, so be it. If it entails going through the curriculum with the teachers in the very same manner as the teachers will go through it with the children, so be it. We cannot continue to place upon the teacher the entire burden of translating a scholarly curriculum into children's language, for we know what will happen: the teacher will deposit that entire burden into the lap of the child.

There is another problem with the traditional approach to teacher education, and it is a problem whose historical roots go very, very deep. There was a time when it was taken for granted that to teach a subject required nothing more than that one possessed the knowledge—or some portion of it—which that discipline had amassed. This made for generation after generation of teachers who may have known their subjects but didn't know how to teach them. In time the pendulum swung to the opposite extreme: teachers who had been drilled in "methods of teaching," but who didn't know their subjects. The time is long overdue for the pendulum to swing back, although perhaps no more than halfway back—to teachers who know enough about their disciplines to teach them, and who are skilled enough in instructional methodology to be able to teach them well.

Given the present state of things educational, this is a very good time for initiating suitable reforms in teacher education. There is a general sense that the content of the knowledge bases of the individual disciplines is rapidly becoming obsolete as far as the rapidly developing disciplines are concerned and increasingly irrelevant as far as the students are concerned. On the other hand, there is no corresponding improvement taking place in pedagogy which would compensate for the declining importance of sheer knowledge as an educational goal, in the way that refineries resort to higher grade processing technologies as they must contend with lower and lower grade ores. There is a limit to how often we can "go back to basics."

If there is to be a genuine shift to "teaching for thinking," it is unlikely that the pedagogical techniques which were hardly successful with "teaching for learning" will be any more successful with this change in educational objectives. It will take more than increased wait time, better eye contact and more frequent use of "Why?" to make education truly reflective. It takes more than the fine tuning of standard classroom management techniques to get students to be thoughtful about their culture and its possibilities.

The problem is, where are we to find a paradigm case of teaching for thinking that will have a bearing upon the way teaching might be conducted in all the disciplines, whether occasionally or consistently? Is there any discipline whose very subject-matter demands teaching for thinking, and can be satisfied with nothing less? The answer is that all of them do, but it may be more difficult to get away with not doing so in philosophy than in any other discipline. Philosophy and thinking—or perhaps, philosophy and the quest for better thinking—go hand in hand. What this means for the topic under discussion is that the methodology of teacher education in philosophy is likely to be highly instructive for the development of patterns of teacher education generally. This is more true of the preparation of elementary school philosophy teachers than of college philosophy instructors, since the latter receive little or no pedagogical enlightenment during their course of studies. What will be discussed here will therefore be restricted to the education of future teachers of grade-school philosophy, and is more a description of present practice than a proposal for future implementation.

We begin with the fact that a philosophy curriculum for the elementary school exists: it is not just on the drawing boards or in the minds of educational theoreticians. It is not just for one grade level, but spans the entire length of the K-12 sequence, with more than enough material for each grade level. This does not mean that it is now complete—perhaps it will never be complete. But the fact that it exists means that teachers can be prepared in their seminars and workshops to do what they will actually be doing on a day-to-day basis with children. The materials are already accessible to children; there is little need to translate them into something thought to be even more accessible.

We should not underestimate the extent to which teacher educators are dominated by the curriculum materials produced by commercial publishers. Such materials

are prepared by teachers and curriculum developers with considerable classroom experience, and the materials reflect the conservative, traditional nature of that experience, rather than the innovations of educational theorists. There are, of course, concessions to what is considered to be trendy, as "thinking skills" are "in" at the moment. And there is great to-do about building a certain "user-friendliness" into the materials. But one should not expect them to be ground-breaking. This places grave constraints upon the methodology of teacher preparation, for it sets a low ceiling upon classroom instructional quality by dumbing down the process of teacher preparation to deliver that level of instruction rather than anything better. The professor of education is a prisoner of the same system as that in which the teacher is incarcerated, even if, in the long run, it is the children who suffer most from that system.

Current teacher-education practice in preparing grade-school philosophy teachers can be said to take place in four stages:

(1) The preparation of teacher educators. The candidates for such training are drawn from the ranks of those who have a strong philosophy background: college philosophy instructors, holders of philosophy PhD's and those of comparable educational background. (Outside the United States, for example, teachers in lycées or gymnasia frequently have as rich a background of course work in philosophy as do recipients of the philosophy doctorate in this country.)

It has been speculated that the high qualifications demanded of the prospective teacher educator, as far as a philosophy background is concerned, constitutes a major potential bottleneck as far as the future dissemination of philosophy for children is concerned. In response it must be said that (1) this hasn't happened yet: the production of trainers has kept pace with the demand for them; (2) only philosophers have the necessary background in logic which trainers must rely on to teach reasoning successfully; and (3) only philosophers have the background in epistemology, ethics and aesthetics that provide the indispensable cement or mortar for holding the separate bricks of the educational edifice together. On the whole,

it is easier to look for philosophers and prepare them to be teacher-trainers than to look for professional educators and prepare them to be philosophers. As for the alleged scarcity of philosophers, the answer is the same as that provided when the question of the scarcity of teachers is raised: the demand will create the supply.

Prospective teacher educators are given a ten-day workshop in which they are exposed to the curriculum, have opportunities to conduct individual sessions, and discuss salient issues at length. (Examples of such topics are moral education, the relationship of philosophy for children to traditional philosophy, the teaching of reasoning, and procedures for working effectively with school districts, including the use of reasoning tests and the relationships to be established with school administrators.)

Subsequently, the prospective teacher/^{educator}serves in a classroom setting as a "philosopher in residence" for four to six weeks, so as to get actual experience in working with children, a pre-requisite for establishing credibility with teachers. Wherever possible, the novice works for a time in tandem with a more experienced trainer before launching out on an independent career.

(2) Preparing teachers: the curriculum exploration stage. A teacher education seminar (or "workshop," as it is more familiarly called) usually consists of 15 or 20 teachers and a teacher-educator. (Some of the more intensive workshops, those that continue for five consecutive days or more, are so arduous that two teacher-educators are needed. It is not unusual for one of these to be a non-philosopher.) These curriculum-examination seminars range in length from three days to fourteen days. The shorter ones deal with but a single program—such as that for fifth and sixth graders. The others generally deal with two programs, such as a third and fourth grade as well as a fifth and sixth grade program. This provides a number of advantages: it prepares each teacher in greater depth, a highly desirable benefit,

and it enables the school system to select teachers with greater flexibility, so that the workshop may be composed of, say, seven third and fourth grade teachers and seven fifth and sixth grade teachers, rather than fourteen from the same level. Each teacher then teaches the program appropriate for his or her level, but is also acquainted with the other program as well.

By and large, teachers are expected to experience this stage in much the same way that the children they will later teach are to experience it. They begin by taking turns reading the assigned section aloud. This gives them experience in hearing the language of the text as well as in listening to one another. The taking turns is an exercise in moral reciprocity, and the collective effect is a sharing of the meanings of the text through their appropriation by the group as a whole. Thus, even in the very first stage of exploring the curriculum, the members of the seminar begin to experience themselves as members of a community of shared experience and shared meanings, the first step towards becoming members of a community of inquiry.

Some teachers object to having to read aloud, or to having their students read aloud. They favor silent reading, just as they prefer paper-and-pencil exercises to classwide discussions. But these are classroom management moves which can be self-defeating, if their net effect is to isolate each student from the other students and the variety of meanings they attain from their own reflections. To pen the individual student up in private practice is in effect to deprive that student of the vital experience of intellectual cooperation, of building on one another's ideas, of savoring the freshness of one another's interpretations, of defending one's ideas when criticized, of enjoying intellectual solidarity with others, and of sensing one's own intellectual integrity when revising one's views in the light of new evidence.

It is not uncommon to confound thinking by oneself with thinking for oneself, and to be under the mistaken impression that solitary thinking is equivalent to independent thinking. Nevertheless we are never so moved to ^{engaged} think for ourselves as when we find ourselves/in shared inquiry with others. The way to protect children from conformist thinking in the presence of others is not to compel them to think silently, but to invite them to think openly and critically. For this to happen in the classroom, it must first happen in the teacher-training seminar. It is only when teachers have had actual experience of a community of inquiry that they can foster the development of one with their own students.

Following the shared reading of the text, the teacher educator invites the class to propose the agenda for the discussion to follow. The formulation of this invitation will differ depending upon the age of the students. With older students, one might ask, "What puzzles (or perplexes) you about this passage?" so as to focus attention on what is problematic in the subject-matter rather than upon that which is settled. With somewhat younger students, one might ask, "What interests you about this passage?" so as to assure that questions or comments emerge out a genuine student involvement with the issues. With very young students, these ways of issuing the invitation may be unsuccessful, because small children are unused^{ed} to being asked for their opinion by adults, and may be somewhat bewildered. Better simply to say, "What do you like about this paragraph (or page)?" and move from there into the discussion.

As student comments are received, they are written on the chalkboard as nearly as possible in the wording in which they were actually expressed. (Every change by the teacher educator or teacher involves the possibility of deviating from the student's intended meaning, with consequent loss of the student's sense of ownership.) It is customary to identify by name the student (whether teacher or child) who has contributed the statement or question, for this is tangible evidence to the student

that the student's participation and originality are respected.

The form of the student's contribution may vary considerably. Some raise questions, some note contrasts or dichotomies (such as real vs. artificial, or art vs. nature, or life vs. art), some simply indicate that there is a single concept (e.g., Truth) that they would like to discuss.

The instructor at this point has a number of options. One, a favorite among teachers but probably of lesser interest to students, is to group the contributions that have been written on the chalkboard. The grouping, while have some value as practice in cognitive classification, also tends to be abstract, tedious and time-consuming. Another strategy is to poll the students in the classroom for the question they would most like to discuss first. Still another is to ask a student who has hitherto been silent to select a question for discussion. Or, one can ask the original contributors to expand on their contributions, or to criticize someone else's, or their own. The task of the instructor is to keep alive the interest generated by the reading and to help it carry over into the discussion, animating it further when it appears to flag, and striving always to generate student-student rather than student-teacher dialogue.

In preparation for the class session, the instructor has reviewed the instructional manual and has selected a group of promising exercises and discussion plans. As the discussion proceeds, one or another of these exercises can be introduced, so that the texture of philosophical practice alternates between free and open discussion on the one hand and specific applications on the other.

(3) Preparing teachers: the modelling stage. It cannot be taken for granted that the practice which teachers engage in during their seminar will be so deeply etched upon their consciousness that they will have no difficulty carrying it over into their respective classrooms. Often they feel troubled and defensive about their limited knowledge of philosophy, when they contrast themselves with their trainer, and this may lead them to compensate by being overly assertive about

their authority in precisely those situations that call for them to profess ignorance, or only limited knowledge. Moreover the trainer's pedagogy with adults may strike them as quite difficult to transfer to classrooms with children. It is for reasons such as these that trainers must actually enter the individual classrooms, take over the lesson for the day and demonstrate to the teacher, with his or her own students, how the trainer would like the material taught. These modelling sessions usually take place about six weeks after the teacher has begun to implement the program in the classroom. They provide that modicum of hand-crafted, personal attention which sharply separates this mode of teacher education from campus courses that do not require the professor to show (rather than merely tell) how the students are to be taught.

(4) Preparing teachers: the observation stage. About six weeks later, trainers return to the classroom in order to observe and evaluate the progress of the teacher's implementation of the program. The evaluation may be oral, written or both. The trainer may ask the teacher questions of critical importance, such as "What did you see me do that you didn't do?" Or the trainer may review such matters as the lack of follow-up questioning, or the teacher's failure to involve all the members of the class. (Trainers are provided with checklists of criteria for gauging teacher performance, and teachers are encouraged to learn these criteria so as to become more critically self-appraisive.)

Because they are formally similar, the preparation of trainers and the preparation of teachers have been treated together in the above discussion. But there obviously are differences—particularly in the fact that the trainers are professionally conversant with philosophy and the teachers have had little (and sometimes unpleasant) exposure to that discipline. One of the things teachers are most eager to know is how to distinguish a philosophical discussion from a non-philosophical discussion. They feel they shouldn't be criticized for failing

to foster philosophical conversation if the trainer has never bothered to make clear what such conversation entails. This is not something the trainer is likely to be able to do overnight. It is usually necessary to show teachers the difference between reading research studies on how children do reason and studying the valid forms of argument by which we ought to reason. It is necessary to introduce them to the distinction between reasons and causes (more formally, between justification and explanation). It is necessary to show them the applicability of philosophy to the unsettled, problematic aspects of any area of knowledge. It is necessary to explain to them how problems seen from within a discipline provide a different kind of understanding from that which is obtained when a discipline becomes an object to itself and looks at itself from a point outside itself. It takes time for these points to be made and to sink in, until they form an essential aspect of the teacher's daily practice. But with proper training and practice, the teacher's awareness of the philosophical dimension of human discourse is heightened almost imperceptibly, day by day, until the difference between a philosophical and a non-philosophical discussion has become so evident that one no longer asks to be shown it. This does not mean, in itself, that the teacher has become a philosopher, but it is evidence as to the teacher's competence in guiding a philosophical discussion, in faithfully observing the cardinal rule not to block the path of inquiry but rather to follow the inquiry where it leads.

CHILDREN'S BOOKS, PICTURES, LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY FOR
CHILDREN

by Bosse Malmhester

In a fourth grade in Sweden - the children are ten years old - we read a novel by Matthew Lipman in which a teacher named Mr Mulligan is present. On one occasion the nine-year-old story-teller says: "Mr Mulligan is as old as the street."

The simile "Mr Mulligan is as old as the street" turned out to lead to many different types of conversations and discussions. Besides renewed acquaintance with concepts as simile and ambiguity, the image tempted into talking about name and identity. The children asked: "What street?" "How can you know how old a street is?" "Suppose the street has got a new pavement, is it the same street as before?" "And if the street changes names?" "If it has the same name and the same direction and extension, is it the same street then?"

The questions were manifold and the pupils found their answers of all that arose. But the teacher and the children together as a whole group did not find a single true answer.

This is an example of the community of inquiry. The children learn to question, listen and temptingly try some explanations, and they get a first notion of the difficult philosophical problem of identification: Where are the boundaries of a thing or a person? What is the essence of the bounded unit?

I've been working for a year with two of Matthew Lipman's novels:

a Kio and Gus in a class of 18 eight-year-old children (grade 2), and

b Pixie in a class of 24 ten-year-old pupils (grade 4).

We worked ^{for}/70 minutes a week and each group read and talked about interesting topics in the books. Since not all of the former pupils could read, the teacher and I did the reading. But all pupils had the text before their eyes. The younger children also had a special "Thinking-book" in which they sometimes wrote questions and sometimes drew pictures inspired by the story.

Both books are focusing the language acquisition, i.e. the verbal language. And I intend to stress here, how important it is for children to be aware that there are other ways of expressing their minds - especially their feelings - than using verbal language. The feelings grasp the whole of a context in a way no single verbal concept can. But by carefully talking you may guide the children to a verbal or a visual expression of what is on their minds. Your aim are here to let them build the relationship between the inner and the outer world or, if you like, relate the language to the world.

If your pupils are making pictures, it is very important to talk about them, to let each child explain meaning and context (maybe in a smaller group).


In Sweden we have in nursery schools some experiences of philosophical questions growing out of children's talks to make grown-ups understand the meaning of their pictures. Questions like these: What is real and what is unreal (mere appearance)? Are only things that you can look at real? Are there colours in the dark? Can you see the good? Is fear a colour?

The discussions lead to new drawings, which lead to new talks... To do this you had better make sure that the pupils make their own pictures, and that nobody tells them what is right and what is wrong, what is good and what is bad. Let their identity grow out of the unique visual thought. Here both the adult and the child learn that to percieve (see) is to realize. The training of perception is the acquiring of understanding. Especially grown-ups become sensitive to the children.

Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp also recommend all sorts of creative activities to accompany verbal communication. And indeed, some children call out loud for drawing and painting, when you read Kio and Gus.

Perhaps it is time for a presentation of the two novels. Their place in the IAPC-curriculum - Philosophy for Children - is illustrated by the following sequence, where Kio and Gus should precede Pixie. Both of them are often seen as a preparation for real philosophy in Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery, which precedes Lisa and Mark.
/Suki

THE SEQUENCE OF PROGRAMS IN THE IAPC CURRICULUM




But the first two books can stand for themselves. I have even used Pixie in the eleventh and the twelfth grades with good effects. There are in the novels some very fundamental concepts, which can lead the children to advanced self-governed thinking. And this is the principal content of this lecture: If we can make the children familiar the following concepts, then they have a firm ground for doing their own thinking and thus avoid all or most of all manipulating.

Let me now show you some pictures from four children's books, which can illustrate a few ways to become familiar with several fundamental concepts.

There are lots of wonderful fiction books for children. Parents read them to their infants, and they talk about the stories and the pictures. The children learn some very important concepts.

Let me take a few examples. In a book titled El viaje de Ida y El viaje de Regreso, i.e. Foreward's journey and Backward's journey, a turtle named Forward among other things sees a fountain (see picture A). If you turn the book upside-down, you follow the turtle Backward's journey, and the same picture turns out to be a lady. (Let us try to turn picture A around.)



A fountain
Picture A


What does a child learn from a picture like this? If you turn a book upside-down a picture of a fountain turns out to be a picture of a lady. The ambiguity becomes a concrete and thrilling phenomenon. Thus, the child experiences the possibility of turning things around and examines them from different points of view. There you have two very central concepts in one phenomenon: perspective and ambiguity.

In another book ("Hus är gott", sa Oskar i.e. "Houses taste good", Oskar said) the children are challenged to follow some consequences of a more or less absurd premiss or assumption. Is a pantry filled with tiles, nails, cement, screws, boards, sawdust, pebbles and gravel consistent with the assumption that it is used by a kid who eats houses. (See picture B and C.)

Hus är gott, sa Oskar


Houses taste good, Oskar said.

Larserik Eriksson



UPPLANDS
HUVU

Picture B



Oskar vill inte äta!
 Han skakar på huvudet
 och vägrar att smaka
 på Oskar doesn't want to eat!
 tyc He shakes his head
 refusing to taste
 Os. what the other children
 äta like best
 gla

Oskar doesn't want
 to eat apples
 he doesn't want
 to eat ice-cream.

Picture D

If Oskar only eats houses and turns down ice-cream and apples (picture D), what candy does he like? Is it consistent that he walks to the ironmonger's and buys mixed screws (picture E)?



When other children go to buy sweets, Oskar goes to the ironmonger's to buy mixed screws put in a cornet.


När andra barn går till gottkiosken, går Oskar till järnaffären. Där köper han blandade skruvar som han får i en strut.

Picture E

In a third book the children get the chance to identify themselves with a baker named Bengtsson. They can see the world as a baker sees it, see it through a perspective of another man. Does not the moon become a crescent and the setting sun a red whortleberry bun, when a baker watches them? (See picture F.)

Baker Bengtsson climbed
his coconut hill
and there he sat
enjoying nature

The sun set, round and red
like a Norrland whortleberry bun
and in the sky
the moon hung like a crescent.




Bagar Bengtsson klättra opp
på sin högsta kokostopp
och där satt han sen och njöt utav naturen.

Solen sjönk så rund och röd
som ett Norrlands lingonbröd
och på himlen hängde månen som en giffel.

Rosamunda Otherwise
has a cat which is a dog
Otherwise as you see
is a town where everything takes place
out and in, back to front, upside-down


Rr

Rosamunda Annorlund
har en katt som är en hund:
Annorlunda som du ser
är en stad där allting sker
ut-och-in och bak-och-fram upp-och-ner.



Rövaren Romulus rövade rasht rövaren Remulus romerska ringar.

Robber Romulus rapidly robbed robber Remulus of his Roman rings.



Picture G

The last book (ABC by Hellsing and Ströyer) contains a fascinating picture (see G), which I myself met, when I was about six years old. It still awakes my strong inner feeling of being puzzled and makes me try to find some clues to ways of organizing the questions which grow inside me. The picture gave me my first notion of opposites and contradictions or inconsistencies - even if arbitrary.

Here you see a cat which is a dog. But the only thing that distinguishes the catlike creature from a usual cat is that it barks. Is it a dog? What is the essential quality of a dog? That it barks? Thus, here the children have to wonder about the difference between important and unimportant qualities (nota bene if they are fascinated by the picture).

Note here that the child does not get a working concept out of this, but it gets a first acquaintance with several logically important concepts - and maybe some pictures serve as a paradigm for later experiences, as I remember this picture did for me. (I called that concept growing in me "the upside-down world", and I believe it was the hat of the man dressed in^a/robe in the picture that apprehended me.)

These are only a few examples, there are plenty of central concepts involved in every other children's book.

Why should you then work with Lipman's books, when there are such wonderful children's books with very stimulating pictures? Perhaps because of the total absence of pictures in Lipman's novels, which forces the children to visualize and make their own images. This takes more time, but your pupils may gain self-confidence in the long run. I do not know.

But I have learned something during the fifteen years I have been struggling as a teacher of philosophy and my own native language in Sweden. I have learned that it is a waste of time to let pupils work with isolated concepts or pieces of knowledge, no matter how fascinating topics. Children just do not see the meaning beyond the momentary emotional flash in the classroom.

That is why I have been searching for tools to make my courses a whole of interconnected concepts or a network of relations between the pupil's everyday experience and the thinking we do in school (e.g. in reading, writing, listening and talking).

My ordinary pupils are sixteen to nineteen years old. They are eighteen when I got them in philosophy, and most of them are by then destroyed by school. They have learned not to think for themselves but to anticipate the teacher's thinking, questions and answers. They have also learned to recite what is said to be essential parts of their textbooks. Of course there are exceptions, but it has taken me almost a whole year to persuade the pupils to open their closed doors for the community of inquiry, when I had found the philosophical tool.

In my Swedish curriculum I have not found the perfect tool yet, but this year of practising to build two communities of inquiry with the help of Kio and Gus and Pixie, I have found a solid ground for my work with the older pupils. I have found parts of Pixie excellent for making these pupils familiar with the concept of analogy.

In searching for a suitable tool and behavior to stimulate the pupils' own thinking, I found this book: This is Robert M. Pirsig's Zen and the Art of motorcycle Maintenance, and it has served me very well for ten years in my philosophical classes. By using

it I gradually found a method which really got my pupils to get involved in discussions full of meaning with implications for their own lives. I have now even reached the point where the young people try to articulate a consistent view of their own philosophy of life.

They read the whole book first and then they all prepare an introduction to a group discussion about parts of it. The engaging and bewildering themes of the book together with my directives that they should write down every or almost every association or reflection during the second reading, usually makes wonder. Half a year of such group- and class discussions starts the formation of a real community of inquiry. The door starts to open.


I have tried the same method in my Swedish curriculum with many very good novels, e.g. The little Prince by Antoine de Saint- Exupéry, A Wizard of Earthsea by Ursula K. LeGuin and plenty of Swedish novels, but it was not the natural end of this course, like the one of forming and articulating your own philosophy of life.

But now the Lipman-Sharp texts have shown me that the mastery of reading (and understanding), of listening (and understanding), of speaking (reflectively and spontaneously) and of writing (carefully) can be a sufficient goal if society as a whole really asks for this competence. But is it so? I wonder.

But let us ask for their thinking skill. Society needs them. Let us create many communities of inquiry, where you take good care of your own mind and really try to understand the thinking of others.

Let me take a few examples from my practice with Kio and Gus and with Pixie.

Reading Pixie you come across a central concept, hard for the children to handle. It is the concept of analogy, which needs some preunderstanding of the meaning of the word "relationship". Here you must use pictures (like the one below) and lots of examples given by children to talk and play with. (Maybe I can teach you a game of analogy later.)



Is the pencil B long or short?

The common picture of the three pencils, which can be related in three different ways, forms a fruitful discussion topic. Ask the children if the pencil B is long or short. Then they discuss relations and maybe observe the analogy.

Lipman and Sharp give you plenty of more or less difficult exercises in their manual Looking for meaning. Try some of those.

I had some problems with the mathematical term of ratio, which later turned out to be fit for use. Look at the mathematical ratio arrangement here:

<u>Spring</u> <u>childhood</u>	<u>short</u> <u>soft</u>
year 	long

You can translate the ratios in the following way: "Spring is related to year as childhood to ..." and "short is to long as soft is to ..."

You must of course note that the most important activity is not to find the "right" answer to put on the dots above (in common mathematical fashion), but to give your reasons for your suggestions. (The relationships in the analogies are those of part and whole relationship and of relation of opposites respectively.)

One central concept in philosophy is of course thinking. Already when we introduced Pixie in the class, the pupils became aware of one essential distinction. We talked about listening to your own thinking, and one boy said that he never thought, while another declared that he always thought. "I can't stop thinking", he said. "When I look at the map of Sweden over there at the wall, I instantly see Sweden. I'm thinking of Sweden directly. But... I'm also able to", it struck him, "to think of the thought of Sweden."

He thereby showed the whole class the distinction between conscious reflection and spontaneous thinking.

Did the boy, who said he did not think at all, mean that he never did any reflective thinking? He never told us, but I am sure that he was unfamiliar with the concept of thinking and not with the phenomenon.

Later other pupils declared that dreams were a kind of thought. No one disputed that.

Here the number of meanings of the word "thought" increased. At the same time we made some distinctions, we also created new ways of thinking of thoughts. If you can see dreams as thoughts, then it is easier to identify and handle thoughts of that kind.

We continued our inquiry and made a distinction between several kind of dreams (or thoughts):

The children gave a lot of examples and characteristics of dreams, obsessions, daydreams and reality. Especially the borderline cases were of great interest to everyone. One boy said: "It's like a dream to walk in a big supermarket. Sometimes you don't know what is true and real and what is not!"

One girl told us that it was as if her mother talked to her in a dream, when she sat watching TV and was daydreaming at the same time. "Afterwards I didn't know what my mother had said!" she exclaimed.

Many children told us how they consciously worked not to give way to daydreaming in school: "I pinch myself very hard every time I catch myself dreaming away!" "I do like Pippi Longstocking: I very sharply tell myself to listen!" Some children were terrified to hear that, while others could not understand the problem. Maybe the later had not distinguished the phenomenon of daydreaming.

About daydreaming and creation a child said with a deep sigh: "I sat daydreaming about writing the story I was inventing, and when the story was ready I looked into my book - and there was nothing!"

In this way we distinguish between more and more various types of thoughts, which children became aware of, and only thereby increase their mastery of their own thinking and existence.

Another time we made a fuss about the ambiguity of the word "thinking". The pupils gave each other lots of examples of behaviour we use in class in order to be able to think (or more precisely, to arrive at a solution of a problem):

They sucked and bit at pencils, pulled and picked at clothes and at parts of their bodies...

But at the same time they gave beautiful examples of how to behave if one does not want to think of something (often horrible things) and examples of what to do to avoid being bored.

It turned out to be a very urgent matter. Everybody talked. These three subjects, which we fussed about, seemed to stimulate each other. A thrilling map of all kinds of thoughts, especially obsessions, were illustrated.

The introduction of Kio and Gus in the second grade (that is eight-year-old children) follow almost the lines above. The topic of our first discussion was ghosts. The pupils immediately presented lots of experiences of ghost phenomena. They were real events, creations of their own imaginations and other kinds of thoughts. Ghosts were in many ways transformed into different kinds of thoughts.

After the many examples two children drew the conclusion: "You are afraid of the unknown", one girl said. Another girl maintained: "Ghosts are things you don't know how to handle." Are ghosts therefore the results of unusual thoughts, you wonder.

Also a special ambiguity of the word "ghost" was cleared out, soon after one of the girls had said: "I have a ghost at the window in my room." Of course it was a paper puppet. So already in the first hour of philosophy for children we prepared the ground for the notion of the concept of ambiguity, i.e. "that you can mean different things by the same word", as one pupil put it.

Two very exciting concepts that worked well together were peculiarity and pride. The talks about them built an important ground for the following ethical discussions. What is "peculiarity" if not another word for Thomas Kuhn's "anomaly". But, why go to advanced philosophers? Look instead at children's spontaneous ways of discovering: What is it that makes them curious? What makes them eager to examine, inquire and discover? The notion of peculiarity.

"How is the giraffe peculiar?" and "What is the pride of the peacock and the elephant?" we asked and the children proposed that you are often proud of qualities which differentiate and characterize you. The context lead them to make the animals proud of their peculiarities. The giraffe is peculiar because of its long neck, but is at the same time proud of it. (What are the effects of such thinking in relation to the respect for strange people?)

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APRENDRE A PENSAR

(El projecte de "Filosofia per nens")

"Filosofia per nens" (Philosophy for children) és el nom d'un projecte creat per Matthew Lipman (EUA.), destinat a la iniciació i desenvolupament del pensament filosòfic en els nens i adolescents, dels sis als disset anys.

Es tracta d'una filosofia prèvia a qualsevol "filosofia"; i és prèvia no perquè iniciï en el llenguatge d'algun corrent o escola filosòfic, sinó perquè és un ensinistrament dels recursos mentals (thinking skills), que l'infant posseeix i ha de desenrotllar.

El programa de Filosofia per nens vol que l'adolescent sigui un agent (i com a tal, un subjecte actiu) de la pròpia maduració intel·lectual; i vol fer-ho de tal manera que les seves capacitats estiguin sempre a punt de ser activades. En una paraula, el programa d'educació analítica (analytic teaching)(1) pretén que l'infant aprengui i sàpiga raonar. La qual cosa ha estat dita de seguida, però caldrà ara engrunar-la i fer-la més explícita.

LA FILOSOFIA A L'ENSENYAMENT

No cal ser un professional de l'ensenyament -primari, secundari o superior- per estar assebitat de la problemàtica que viu l'ensenyament en relació a la seva qualitat i als quantitativament migrats avenços que experimenten els estudiants (sobretot de primària i secundària)...; 'estudis inútils' o 'fracàs escolar'; són alguns dels termes que hom usa per referir-s'hi.

La Filosofia com a àrea de coneixements que hom posa a disposició/obligació de l'alumne, pateix la mateixa situació que altres assignatures, i -majorment- el vist-i-plau dels estudiants per la filosofia no se sol obtenir més que en l'àrea de l'ensenyament universitari. És una opinió generalitzada entre els estudiants de batxillerat que la Filosofia és un "pal", en la qual costa de veure-hi la connexió que pugui tenir, no solament amb altres assignatures, sinó principalment amb els seus interessos actuals,

perquè els estudiants de batxillerat no veuen la connexió entre la Filosofia i la seva vida.

amb les seves experiències i vivències diàries, i amb les seves expectatives de futur.

Quin valor tenen per a la meua pròpia formació, els coneixements que pugui obtenir de la Història de la Filosofia en el curs d'orientació universitària?, es demana l'estudiant; o bé, la psicologia, la lògica, la sociologia. ... etc. del 3er. curs de batxillerat què és el que em comuniquen?. Què representa per a mi, estudiant de batxillerat, tot el que una munió de psicòlegs, sociòlegs, filòsofs ha dit en determinats moments de la Història?. Com incideixen tots aquests coneixements i aquestes dades en la meua vida i la meua educació?.

Crec que el fet de no poder/saber donar resposta a preguntes com aquestes, provoca o ajuda a provocar el sentiment de rebuig, de intolerància o de indiferència en relació a tantes matèries que entren a formar part de l'ensenyament al nostre país, i entre elles, la filosofia

Seguint la línia de pensament del pragmatisme filosòfico-pedagògic (J. Dewey), línia de la qual Lipman recull bona part del contingut del seu mètode, podem dir que una de les possibles causes del baix rendiment en els estudis d'un gran percentatge d'estudiants, és la desvinculació, la manca de vincle entre les matèries que s'ensenyen i l'experiència de vida que té l'estudiant. Hem vist també que la filosofia es troba en aquesta mateixa situació. A la filosofia li passa això o bé una cosa molt semblant, però que té el mateix resultat: entre l'experiència de l'estudiant i el pensament de molts autors sí que hi ha connexió, però és una connexió difícilment captible per aquell individu que s'està iniciant en un joc o moviment conceptual, és una connexió difícil d'assolir per part de l'estudiant; solució: memorització sobre el buit experiencial; conseqüència: l'experiència del filòsof no és re-experimentada (re-pensada) per l'estudiant; conclusió: quin sentit té la filosofia?.

FILOSOFIA I EXPERIENCIA DE VIDA

En aquest punt entra en joc l'educació analítica, directament enfocada cap al món filosòfic, però desplegant una gran rendibilitat en molts altres camps de l'ensenyament. Aquí entra en joc el programa de Filosofia

per nens. El programa de Matthew Lipman acosta educació i experiència. I ho fa per dues raons: 1ª) el concepte ha de sorgir de l'experiència, com a manera filosòfica per poder tractar, després, la mateixa experiència.

2ª) La conceptualització és una experiència que es viu (no que es llegeix, o s'escolta, solament) en el treball de classe, a través de la comunitat de investigació.

Veiem, ara, aquests dos punts una mica més de prop.

1er) L'única manera, realment profitosa, rendible i profunda, d'estimular l'estudiant cap a un estudi en profunditat i dedicació, és que l'estudiant es trobi davant de quelcom que li resulti interessant, i això és —o sol ser— la infinitat de situacions en les quals l'estudiant, l'alumne, es troba i es pot trobar. Vull dir que allò que primerament motiva l'estudiant és donar una ullada a la seva experiència o possible experiència real de vida. És a partir d'aquesta seva experiència real on l'estudiant ha de començar a desenrotllar el seu pensament, on s'ha de iniciar en el pensament filosòfic. I això és el que volem indicar amb els mots 'conceptualització de l'experiència'. A través d'un mètode i uns exercicis, l'alumne comença a fer de la seva experiència un objecte de investigació, un objecte de pensament; amb l'anàlisi de la seva experiència comença a ensinistrar-se en l'adquisició d'un pensament crític, que posa en joc els valors que ell mateix atorga a les coses i a més li ofereix la possibilitat dialèctica (socràtica) de reforçament o superació d'aquests valors.

2on) L'alumne discuteix en comunitat amb els seus companys determinats temes que han sorgit o que han estat plantejats per unes lectures (novel·les) especialment dirigides i pensades per desenrotllar aquesta feina de revisió i conceptualització de l'experiència de l'estudiant.

Matthew Lipman és l'autor d'aquestes novel·les, i en elles ha exposat moltes situacions que entren a formar part del món de l'adolescent: discussions amb els companys, baralles, relacions amb els familiars, problemes..., l'ambient escolar, jocs, relació del món infantil i juvenil amb els animals i la natura... etc.

Aquestes seqüències de la vida de l'adolescent són llegides en veu alta enmig del grup d'estudiants, com a punt de partida d'un diàleg que s'ha d'establir sobre els temes que la comunitat ^{troba} en la lectura esmentada. El debat que s'inicia no és un debat anàrquic, encara que el diàleg comença i acaba quan la comunitat ho decideix; el debat sobre els temes segueix un determinat procediment, de tal manera que tots els membres del grup tinguin l'oportunitat d'expressar el seu punt de vista, i d'una manera ordenada. Precisament el fet que un individu de la comunitat vulgui exposar la seva opinió és el que permet parlar del potencial educatiu que aquest mètode té: les afirmacions d'aquest element de la comunitat de investigació seran engrunades i sotmeses a investigació i anàlisi, tant des del punt de vista de la coherència lògica com de la seva significació ontològica, com del valor estètic, social o ètic que pugui tenir.

La feina de conceptualització segueix més o menys aquesta línia: suposem que en el text o en algun paràgraf del text sorgeix (i els membres del grup l'escullen per sotmetre'l a debat) el tema de l'amistat.

L'objectiu final està fixat en la definició de l'amistat, és a dir, la formulació filosòfica i precisa del concepte d'amistat. De fet, tan important és desenrotllar en grup aquesta tasca com assolir-ne el resultat final.

Primer s'inicia una exploració sobre diversos camps de l'experiència on s'aplica o pot ser aplicat el concepte d'amistat: "a) Cal que les persones tinguin la mateixa edat per ser amigues?. b) Dues persones poden ser amigues i tanmateix no avenir-se l'una amb l'altra?. c) És possible que dues persones s'enganyin, i tanmateix siguin amigues?"(2)

Els estudiants preparen, així, una base prou ampla de casos com per poder bastir (encara que sigui provisionalment) un concepte prou sòlid de l'amistat, i poder-lo aplicar a noves situacions interrogades,

"en aplicar un concepte a un conjunt específic de casos, els infants han de ser capaços d'identificar aquells casos que són clarament dins dels límits del concepte, i aquells que cauen clarament fora dels seus límits. Els infants han de ser encoratjats a citar contraexemples

si creuen que els límits del concepte han estat incorrectament marcats. Els exercicis i el pla de discussió es concentren en els casos extrems"

(M. Lipman)

Un altre exemple seria el cas de fer generalitzacions correctes:

"donat un conjunt de fets, els estudiants han de ser capaços de notar les uniformitats o regularitats que apareixen, i de construir una generalització que sigui aplicable a aquests i a altres casos similars. Els estudiants han d'estar també a l'aguait dels atzars que comportin aquestes generalitzacions" (M. Lipman)

Un exemple:

"Els Rolling Stones són homes joves i estrelles del rock; els Bee Gees són homes joves i estrelles del rock; milers d'homes joves són estrelles del rock; els jugadors de tal equip de futbol són homes joves, són també estrelles del rock?" (3)

Podriem citar diversos exemples i exercicis que acompanyen la discussió d'un tema determinat, i així anar veient quines habilitats mentals va posant en joc el programa de Filosofia per nens; veuríem, per exemple com es desenrotlla la capacitat de formular relacions de causa-efecte; obtenir conclusions d'una i de dues premisses; saber quan cal evitar i quan cal tolerar ambigüitats; aprendre a fer distincions; reconèixer la dependència entre mitjans i fins; reconèixer la naturalesa contextual de la veritat i la falsedat...etc., etc.

En tots els casos el professor actua de conductor del diàleg/debat, intentant elevar el llenguatge a un nivell i comprensió conceptual més rics i precisos, de tal manera que els individus del grup vegin en el pensament filosòfic (és a dir, el seu propi discurs sotmès a una formulació i conceptualització més profundes) una eina clarificadora del seu llenguatge, del seu pensament, de la seva experiència i de la seva ca-

APRENDRE A PENSAR

‘Aprendre a pensar’ pel programa de Filosofia per nens té un significat molt determinat, fa referència al fet que l’estudiant disposi d’aquelles habilitats mentals, que abans hem esmentat, i altres que podem afegir-hi com són.: trobar i prevenir contradiccions en el llenguatge, saber captar i expressar les relacions part-tot, aportació de bones raons que fonamentin una afirmació determinada, relacions de transitivitat entre diferents afirmacions, diferències de grau i espècie, ambigüitat i concisió en el llenguatge, discurs lògic i analògic, utilització lògica del llenguatge informatiu, relacions de inclusió o exclusió entre conceptes...etc. ...etc.. Es tracta de tot un seguit de disposicions intel·lectuals de l’estudiant que presuposen una base pedagògica que resti una certa importància a l’aspecte informatiu-memorístic de l’ensenyament, per tal de potenciar un ensenyament de tipus més actiu, en el qual l’estudiant aprèn actuant i amb el qual es dirigeix cap un ideal pedagògic que té en compte més l’aspecte educacional globalitzador, que no d’acumulació de dades.

L’aspecte educacional (tan oblidat en l’ensenyament actual) és possible en la mesura que, per una banda, el fet de reforçar aquestes habilitats rapercuteix en una base conceptual més ferma, que permet un major rendiment escolar en àrees on intervé el càlcul matemàtic i en les àrees de la lectura i el llenguatge; treballant amb aquest mètode

“hom proporciona precisament les destreses cognitives que actualment no són ensenyades, i que són essencials per assolir l’èxit acadèmic”.

(M. Lipman)

Per altra banda, el desenvolupament de les habilitats mentals, en un curs de Filosofia per nens, no es fa d’una manera exclusivament formal, sinó que també es fa atenent el contingut significatiu de les afirmacions que es fan en les sessions de treball. Aquest fet proporciona a l’estudiant la possibilitat de poder connectar la seva formació amb la seva experiència diària, i establir constantment la relació entre l’educació que rep i la vida que viu, amb la conseqüent potenciació de la seva ca-

pacitat crítica. D'aquests dos aspectes en tornarem a parlar més endavant. Així, amb les expressions 'aprendre o saber pensar', 'saber raonar'...etc., ens referim a la capacitat d'una acurada utilització del pensament amb l'exercici i desenvolupament d'aquelles habilitats mentals a què abans ens hem referit. Pensar amb base a la utilització d'aquestes disponibilitats, vol dir poder parlar, ja, de pensament filosòfic, en la mesura que això significa un pensament acurat i rigorós, que fa una utilització profunda dels conceptes que entren a formar part de l'experiència d'un infant, en un moment donat.

Tal com hem dit abans, Matthew Lipman ha recollit pel seu programa 'Philosophy for Children' una bona dosi del pragmatisme deweyà, segons el qual el context on es mou l'estudiant (infant o adolescent), estimula o inhibeix la intel·ligència, la creativitat i la imaginació. Així Lipman, d'un grup d'estudiants en fa una comunitat de investigació (community of inquiry) que s'estableix en el medi social-escolar, s'estableix com a context, a partir del qual els membres del grup s'eduquen, desenrotllant la feina de investigar i conceptualitzar la seva respectiva experiència escolar i extra-escolar, la seva vida en general.

Crear a la classe una comunitat de investigació (a propòsit de determinats temes de discussió i investigació, que acaba amb una conceptualització, una comprensió filosòfica de la realitat, que ha estat sotmesa a debat i a investigació) és crear un medi, un ambient estructurat de tal manera que estimuli la investigació conceptual del món on es mou l'estudiant.

Aquesta tasca, desenrotllada per l'alumne en comunitat amb els seus companys, obra unes possibilitats d'èxit molt més amples a l'hora d'enfrontar-lo, més endavant, durant les darreres etapes del batxillerat, amb els continguts filosòfics o científics de diversos autors o escoles de diferents moments de la Història.

No caldria dir que aquest treball de conceptualització i clarificació conceptual ha de mostrar, també, els seus profits en l'ensenyament universitari, en la mesura que l'ensenyament superior és abordat per individus amb un potencial de raonament molt més preparat.

Aprendre a pensar, aprendre a raonar té repercussions en altres esferes, a més dels estudis dels infants i dels adolescents. La primera d'elles és el medi social que els envolta. Degut a les tècniques o modes d'actuació del programa de Philosophy for Children -dels quals n'hem vist una petita mostra-, l'infant s'acostuma a pensar per si mateix (pensament crític), a compartir la seva recerca amb els companys del grup o classe (solidaritat), a escoltar, considerar i respectar les afirmacions i propostes dels seus companys (pensament ordenat i pensament democràtic). Sense pretendre amb això presentar aquesta escola (l'escola funcionant d'aquesta manera) com l'eina de transformació social (amb tot el que hi ha aquí de pragmatisme i de utopia), però sí pretenent -en la mesura del possible- que l'educació posi el seu gra de sorra pel progrés de l'home i de la societat, aquest programa recull i inicia l'estudiant (a través de l'escola) en el comportament democràtic d'una societat reflexiva i atenta al seu esdevenir.

Bàsicament el propòsit de l'educació analítica pretén fer de l'alumne, de l'infant, un individu -tal com abans hem dit- que pensi per si mateix: aquest objectiu té com a principal mitjà el diàleg que es genera per l'anomenada comunitat de investigació:

"En el programa de Filosofia per nens, el desenvolupament de les habilitats de raonament no es duen a terme exclusivament en les decisions de la classe, però és aquí on es fa més evident l'exercici i el reforçament d'aquestes habilitats. A alguns nois els agrada llegir, d'altres els agrada escriure, però gairebé a tots els agrada parlar.

El problema és transformar l'energia d'aquest impuls en una habilitat de raonament, tal com un sistema de transmissió d'un automòbil transforma la força bruta del motor en el moviment dirigit i disciplinat de les rodes. El mer parlar pot ser convertit

en una conversa, una discussió, un diàleg. Això vol dir tant aprendre a escoltar els altres com a expressar les seves idees (històriques o actuals) que l'estudiant

també aprendre a respondre efectivament. Això significa aprendre a seguir les diverses línies de raonament que tenen lloc durant la discussió: avaluar els postulats que estan a la base de cada expressió, obtenir inferències, verificant-ne la consistència i abast, aprenent a pensar amb independència, escollint lliurement, escollint lliurement les pròpies premisses. En qualsevol moment de la conversa, cada participant està ocupat en incomputables actes mentals, alguns en harmonia amb altres, altres completament independents dels altres, alguns en convergència, altres en divergència. La tasca de la lògica és disciplinar el diàleg. Això s'aconsegueix encoratjant els participants a utilitzar les regles de la lògica com a criteri per legitimar inferències -de fet, com a criteri per distingir entre un bon i un pobre raonament-

(M. Lipman)

De tot això en resulta un pensament ensinistrat, un pensament més rigorós i més motivat per desenrotllar el seu potencial. El fet que tota aquesta tasca parteixi de les situacions quotidianes i es produeixi en situacions quotidianes (a l'escola) és una garantia de connexió entre aprenentatge/educació i vida, de connexió entre escola i societat, de connexió entre pensament i acció. En el fons el propòsit està en fer individus amb un potencial mental més acurat i desenrotllat, els rendiments del qual es troben no només en l'ensenyament primari o secundari, sinó que repercuteixen en l'ensenyament superior o universitari, al qual hom hi accedeix amb un cabal de recursos intel·lectuals i mentals molt més preparat i enfortit; i també (segons s'ha dit) repercuteix en l'àmbit extra-escolar.

La filosofia, tant en el batxillerat com en la Universitat no cau, així, en un terreny que encara cal adobar, sinó que ja està en possessió dels recursos necessaris (pensament filosòfic) per integrar qualsevol filosofia, fent-ne d'ella una experiència (històrica o actual) que l'estudiant

re-viu, re-pensa i que en definitiva atorga un sentit.

Josep Cullell i Ramis

Notes.

(1) "analitic teaching", tradueixo per educació analítica i no ensenyament analític, intentant amb això recollir el caràcter de formació integral que suposa per a l'estudiant aquest mètode.

(2) Matthew Lipman, Philosophical Inquiry. p. 112

(3) " " " p. 113

... a qual s'ha de ... no relaciona amb
altres assignatures, sinó principalment amb els ... interessos actius;
... de ...

**Erster Internationale
Kongreß für
Kinderphilosophie**

**First International
Conference
on Philosophy
for Children**

**ABSTRACTS
KURZFASSUNGEN**

27.–31. Mai 1987

May 27th–May 31st

Schloß St. Martin/Graz

Schloß St. Martin/Graz

Friedrich Wallner (Universität Wien)

Der kinderphilosophische Aspekt allen Philosophierens

In diesem Vortrag geht es mir darum, zu einem besseren Verständnis des Phänomens "Philosophie" beizutragen. Es soll geprüft werden, ob das Philosophieren als solches kindliche Strukturen hat. Außerdem soll diskutiert werden, welche Bedingungen die Philosophie erfüllen muß, um der These "Eine eigene Welt haben, heißt eine eigene Philosophie haben" zu genügen.

In diesem Zusammenhang sollen zwei Thesen über die Aufgaben der Kinderphilosophie diskutiert werden; die Förderung der vorwissenschaftlichen Kreativität und der produktiven Normierung.

Eric Matthews (University of Aberdeen, Scotland).

Science-fiction as a tool for teaching philosophy

Abstract

Philosophy in schools should not be taught simply as a branch of cultural history. Nor should it be purely taught for its instrumental value, as a medium for developing reasoning skills. Philosophy should expand the child's imaginative horizon, encouraging reflection about fundamental concepts and values. If philosophy is taught in this spirit, science-fiction stories can be a very useful tool, since many of them explore conceptual possibilities, not in the form of abstract argument, but in that of concrete story-telling, which more immediately engages the child's attention. I describe my own use in teaching of Isaac Asimov's story *Bicentennial Man*, which explores the nature of humanity through a story about the humanization of a robot. I give examples of the way in which the story raises such issues as free-will, personal identity, human rights and moral values. I show how its treatment can be used to present these issues to adolescent school pupils, and discuss their responses to this approach.

Hans-Ludwig Freese (Freie Universität Berlin)

Philosophieunterricht für Kinder anhand von Texten
oder "Philosophie als Unterrichtsprinzip"

Im ersten Teil des Referats sollen Probleme der Auswahl und Gestalt möglicher Textgrundlagen des Philosophieunterrichts erörtert werden; u.a. geht es dabei um den Versuch einer Typologie von philosophischen Unterrichtstexten mit ihren jeweiligen didaktischen und methodischen Implikationen und um die Frage, ob es möglich ist, "klassische" philosophische Texte für Kinder so umzuschreiben, daß sie sprachlich verständlicher werden, ohne aber daß wesentliche Abstriche an gedanklicher Substanz gemacht werden müssen.

Im zweiten Teil des Referats soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, was "Philosophie als Unterrichtsprinzip" heißen kann, ob damit eine Alternative zum lehrgangsgebundenen Philosophieunterricht eröffnet wird, welche curricularen und unterrichtsorganisatorischen Ansatzpunkte es gibt und ob der Philosophieunterricht als die Einzelfächer transzendierender und übergreifender etwas zur Überwindung der Zersplitterung des Lehrplans beitragen kann.

Per Jespersen (Dänemark)

Welche Rolle spielen Kurzgeschichten beim Philosophieren mit Kindern ?

How we can use a short-text in philosophy for children

What is a short-text ?

Possibilities with short-texts

A little about my work in Denmark

An important proposal for the world-wide work of the next year

Distribution of a short-text: THE WONDER-DOUGH with a short manual

LEARNING TO OPERATE WITH PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS

The ability of children to philosophize has often been questioned. Various reasons have been put forward for this shortcoming. Frequently doubt has been cast on children's skill in handling abstract concepts. Arguments for this view have been found in the developmental psychology of Piaget, according to which the ability to handle concepts of a certain level of abstraction is strictly limited to a minimum age or developmental level. One should not ignore the fact that there is empirical evidence for the opinions of Piaget. There is also empirical evidence to the contrary. Especially Soviet learning theory has developed teaching methods which stimulate abstract mental processes and concept formation.

Philosophy for Children has preponderantly started from the assumption that there is no fundamental difference between the thinking of adults and the thinking of children: both categories make use of the same mental operations. At the same time children seem to be interested in the same basic questions about life and its meaning as adults. Considering these facts, children and adults seem to participate in the same activity when they jointly discuss philosophical questions, the latter being the eternal questions which spontaneously come to the human mind when it opens itself to the world.

Wondering at the world and asking penetrating questions certainly are characteristics of children, though one can easily exaggerate the unconventionality of the child's way of thinking. In equating this attitude with philosophy too swiftly, however, one underrates the conceptual difficulties inherent in philosophical questions. In idealizing the philosophical activity of children one may miss their real abilities. Philosophizing with children can than easily degenerate into a collective wondering at banalities or into a mutual misunderstanding.

Philosophical questions are never just there, waiting to be picked up by the wondering mind. The question is asked, and thereby certain expectations concerning the answer are created. These expectations are not always the same for all participants of the discussion, especially when some of them are children, and others adults.

A precondition for asking a question is the use of adequate concepts, which constitute the framework for the expected answer. A consequence of this is, that concepts vary with these expectations. More than that: discussion of a supposedly philosophical question will often force the disputants to broaden, narrow, shift, in short, to change their concepts, thereby transforming the original question.

This transformation process is rarely fully appreciated by teachers. Amusing misunderstandings may result, the children seeing no problem at all when the meaning of the question depends on the use of certain categories which do not come naturally to the child's mind and the teacher misunderstanding their incomprehension for obstinacy.

Philosophical concepts distinguish themselves from those of daily life by their generality, by their abstract character; but especially by their complexity: most philosophical concepts are no simple class concepts which can be dealt with by prototype learning. Learning to philosophize may therefore add a new dimension to the conceptual learning of children, but only if their inherent difficulties are not ignored.

Illustrations of these various concept learning processes and of the misunderstandings frequently implied will be supplied. The paper will be read in English, but discussion may take place in either English or German.

Ron Reed (Texas Wesleyan College, USA)

Internal and External Limitations on the Growth
of Philosophy for Children

Philosophy For Children, the program which first began attracting worldwide attention in 1974 with the publication of Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery, has made enormous strides in the past decade. A program which originated from a small office at Montclair State College in New Jersey can now boast of numerous centers throughout the world. Given that sort of growth, it may be a bit presumptuous to wonder why it has not grown faster than it has. Still, Philosophy For Children_x has not exhibited the same sort of rapid growth as such programs as Assertive Discipline, Teacher Effectiveness Training, and Value Clarification.

In this paper, the author will attempt to delineate those factors which slow the growth of Philosophy For Children. Some of those factors, most notably the training of teachers in Philosophy For Children, are internal to the program. Other factors, for example, the fear of what in the United States is called "secular humanism", are external to the program. The author will make specific recommendations for change, but will also contend that some of the factors that inhibit growth are to be applauded - they are essential to the integrity of the program.

Philosophy for Children or Philosophy of Children ?

To connect "philosophy" to "children" necessarily leads to a distinction between two aspects:

- 1) Philosophy f o r children
- 2) Philosophy o f children

How can they be brought together ? Philosophy for children has a long tradition; it's roots can be found in philosophical and theological education. Philosophy of - and, last not least, philosophy b y children - has no traditional background and is more a result of modern education. Authors like A.S. Neill and Jacob Needleman are representing types of philosophical educators, who seem to leave the authority of knowledge and to enter a space, in which children are equally intitled to them.

The tension between philosophy f o r and philosophy o f children is object of my reflection on the theme, which is empirically based on a two-years-work with a 12-year-old boy.

Barbara Brüning und Maria Beimel (Philosophischer Gesprächskreis für
Kinder und Eltern e.V. Hamburg, BRD)

Was ist eine philosophische Diskussion mit jüngeren Kindern ?

1. Praxisteil (Maria Beimel)

- Information über die Ziele des "Philosophischen Gesprächskreises für Kinder und Eltern e.V. Hamburg"
- kurze Darstellung der bisher geleisteten Arbeit (Kindergruppen, Kurse für Erwachsene, Publikation von Materialien)
- Information über künftige Projekte und die Zusammenarbeit mit der Universität Hamburg

2. Theorieteil (Barbara Brüning)

- thesenartige Zusammenfassung bisher diskutierter Kriterien für eine philosophische Diskussion mit Kindern
- nähere Betrachtung zweier Kriterien, die mich aufgrund meiner praktischen Erfahrung in Kindergruppen besonders interessieren, und die ich deshalb gern in die Diskussion bringen möchte:
 1. Welche Rolle spielen Gefühle in einer philosophischen Diskussion mit Kindern? In welcher Weise fördern oder hemmen sie eine Diskussion? Kann und soll Philosophieren auch dazu beitragen, so etwas wie eine Gefühlskultur zu entwickeln?
 2. Wie können nicht-verbale Ausdrucksformen, hauptsächlich visuelle Elemente, in eine philosophische Diskussion mit Kindern einfließen?

Ann Margaret Sharp (Montclair State College, USA)

Is There an Essence of Education?

This paper maintains that imaginative philosophical dialogue is essential to what is meant by education. It is a necessary condition. Whether it is a sufficient condition for education depends on what one means by intellectual autonomy, personhood and human rights. The author also contends that if one could show that dialogical education within the context of a community of inquiry was a necessary condition for the formation of autonomous educated persons and, further, that it is appropriate to talk of persons as natural kinds with an essence, then one could argue that one can speak meaningfully of the essence of education as contextensive with the development of an autonomous person who has the ability to think well and to think for himself or herself about matters of importance.

Gareth B. Matthews (University of Massachusetts, USA)

Die Philosophie als vernunftsgemäße Rekonstruktion der Kindheit

Ich schlage vor, das Fach Philosophie soll als reife Reaktion auf kindliche Fragen angesehen werden. In gewisser Hinsicht ist die Philosophie, meiner Meinung nach, eine Idealisierung der Kindheit - eine vernunftsgemäße Rekonstruktion der besten Weise, mit Bedrohungen der kognitiven und moralischen Kompetenz fertig zu werden. Diese Bedrohungen kommen nicht so sehr von Außen her, etwa von anderen Menschen her, oder von der Umgebung her, als von Innen, von innerlichen, begrifflichen Hindernissen. Sie müssen überwunden werden, wenn man die Welt und seine eigene Rolle in der Welt verstehen will. (1)

Die erste Schlußfolgerung aus meiner These ist diese: Wir Erwachsenen, seien wir Lehrer, Eltern oder Kindheitserforscher, sollen uns nicht leicht von den intellektuellen und moralischen Problemen der Kindheit entfernen. Kinderprobleme sind auch unsere Probleme.

Noch eine Schlußfolgerung aus meiner These ist diese: Eine Bemerkung oder Frage eines Kindes kann einem Erwachsenen die Möglichkeit eines echten Gedankenaustausches anbieten, eines Austausches frei von der falschen und abstumpfenden Annahme, daß der Erwachsene von Anfang an die Antworten schon wüßte.

Die Möglichkeit für einen ersten, spielerischen Dialog über die Grundfragen der Welt und der Existenz ist eines der schönsten Geschenke, das uns das Kind anzubieten hat.

Brigitte Rollett (Universität Wien)

Entwicklungspsychologische Grundlagen des Philosophierens
im Kindesalter

Zur Darstellung des Entwicklungsverlaufes philosophierelevanter Bereiche sind mehrere Ansätze geeignet. Das interaktionistische Konzept Piagets geht von einer vorgegebenen Abfolge von Stadien aus, die durch entsprechende Umweltanregungen aktiviert werden müssen. Schon früh hat Aebli gezeigt, daß diese Stadien durch Trainingsangebote vorverlegt werden können. Rauh wies nach, daß die Entwicklung nicht so einheitlich verläuft, wie dies Piaget angenommen hatte, sondern durch eine globale Auseinandersetzung mit Komplexität charakterisiert ist, in deren Rahmen sowohl Retardierungen und Regressionen, aber auch Akzelerationen möglich sind.

Nach Untersuchungen von Rollett konstituiert sich die Welt des Kindes im Entwicklungsverlauf zunächst nach drei Prinzipien, die bestimmen, was für relevant und damit beachtenswert gehalten wird: Das Lust-Unlust-Prinzip im ersten Lebensjahr, das soziale Bewertungsprinzip bis zum Alter von etwa zweieinhalb Jahren und das argumentative Bewertungsprinzip, das sich in den Konflikten des Zweieinhalbjährigen mit seiner Umwelt herauskristallisiert. Die drei Relevanzprinzipien werden nicht einfach von der nächstfolgenden Entwicklung abgelöst, sondern bestehen nebeneinander weiter. Die Fähigkeit des Kindes, sich in kritischer Weise mit den Umweltinformationen auseinanderzusetzen entscheidet, welches Prinzip zur Lösung welcher Umweltsituationen benützt wird, wie eine Untersuchung bei Studierenden gezeigt hat.

Mit der sicheren Beherrschung der Sprache zwischen drei und vier Jahren kann der Prozeß der argumentativen Konstituierung der Realität internalisiert werden. Dies gilt auch für die ethische Entwicklung, wie Untersuchungen von Piaget und Kohlberg nachgewiesen haben. Am Beispiel des Verständnisses des Begriffes "Traum" bei Vorschulkindern konnten wir zeigen, daß die subjektive Sicherheit, daß Geträumtes nicht real sei, ein altersabhängiges Entwicklungsmerkmal darstellt. Wie Erikson festgehalten hat, besteht die Entwicklungsaufgabe des Schulalters in der

Auseinandersetzung mit der Antinomie Kompetenz versus Minderwertigkeit; Kompetenz aber bedeutet, daß man in der Lage ist, sowohl die äußere Welt reflektierend und handelnd zu verstehen und auf sie einzuwirken, als auch die innere Welt. Kinder dieser Altersgruppe zeigen daher ein besonderes Interesse an der Philosophie, die sie als Hilfe bei dieser Entwicklungsaufgabe empfinden. Lompscher hat ein Programm zur Entwicklung geistiger Fähigkeiten erarbeitet, das zeigt, daß die Stufe formaler Denkop^{er}ationen bei geeigneten Trainingsmaßnahmen erheblich vorverlegt werden kann.

Unsere Kultur und Zivilisation ist wesentlich durch die Medien gestaltet. Im Fernsehzeitalter tritt neben die Erfahrungswelt die über das Fernsehen vermittelte Information. Dies bedeutet eine erhebliche Zunahme der Informationsvielfalt, aber auch einen Einbruch in die natürliche Entwicklung: Gesehene Inhalte können nicht beeinflußt werden. Nach der Locus-of-controll-Theorie von Rotter führt dies zur Überzeugung, die Welt nicht kontrollieren zu können bzw., nach Seligmann, zu Formen der gelernten Hilflosigkeit. Wie Vitouch zeigen konnte, haben vor allem jene Kinder Probleme beim Aufbau einer kritisch-realistischen Weltsicht, deren Eltern autoritäre Erziehungsprinzipien vertreten. Diese Kinder neigen zu einem verstärkten Fernsehkonsum. Ihre Eltern halten Gespräche mit ihren Kindern für überflüssig und beschränken sich auf eher dirigistische Interaktionen. Dies sind genau die Bedingungen, die dazu führen, daß Kinder die Welt des Philosophierens nicht entdecken. Weiß konnte in einer an unserem Institut gerade abgeschlossenen Projekt nachweisen, daß diese Kinder größere Probleme dabei haben, zu verstehen, daß die Gestalten von Zeichentrickfilmen nicht real sind.

In einer immer komplexer werdenden und von der unmittelbaren Erfahrung entfernteren Umwelt stellt das Philosophieren für Kinder die Chance dar, sich aktiv und kritisch mit ihr auseinanderzusetzen und so zu kompetenten Persönlichkeiten zu werden.

Daniela G. Camhy und Gunter Iberer (Universität Graz)

Ein Forschungsvorhaben zur Förderung der Denk- und Persönlichkeitsentwicklung von
Volks-Haupt-AHS-Schülern

Die zentrale Aufgabe des Projekts "Philosophieren für Kinder", die durch das Forschungsvorhaben untersucht werden soll, ist die Überprüfung der Hypothese, daß durch einen Philosophieunterricht, in dessen Zentrum der Aufbau einer philosophischen Fragestellung steht, die Denk- und Persönlichkeitsentwicklung von Schülern gefördert wird.

Bekanntlich stellen Kinder mehr Fragen, als zehn Weise beantworten können. Hinter den Fragen verbirgt sich oft die Ahnung eines tieferen philosophischen Problems. Unklarheiten, ihre Zweifel, Vorstellungen und Auffassungen können sie in eine geistige Unruhe versetzen, die nach Durcharbeitung verlangt. Wenn Kinder mit diesen Fragen allein gelassen werden, wird eine unwiederbringliche Chance vertan, sie in ihrer geistig-seelischen Entwicklung zu fördern. Philosophieren mit Kindern hat die Aufgabe, an der Neugierde und dem Wissensdurst der Schüler anzusetzen, das Fragen und Weiterfragenwollen zu wecken und sie so in ihrem Prozeß des Entdeckenlernens und des selbständigen Nachdenkens zu unterstützen.

Ein Schwerpunkt dieses Projekts ist es, in einer Art Forschergemeinschaft von Lehrer und Schülern, die "Mobilität des Denkens" (logisches und kreatives Denken) zu fördern und zu üben - das Begründen, Definieren, das Aufstellen von Hypothesen, das Entwickeln von Alternativen und Möglichkeiten, das Formulieren von Entscheidungen und das Wahrnehmen von verschiedenen Perspektiven.

Das Projekt betont weiters das Philosophieren in einer bestimmten Dialogform, dem "sokratischen Lehrgespräch" vergleichbar. Diese Form des Gesprächs stellt eine Herausforderung an den Lehrer dar.

Einerseits ist es seine Aufgabe, anhand seiner Kenntnisse an den Interessen und Gedanken der Schüler anzuknüpfen, Fragen zu stellen, aber auch für Transparenz und Ergiebigkeit des Gesprächs zu sorgen. Andererseits soll er seine überlegene Fachkenntnis nicht direkt zur Kenntnis bringen, um die Reflexion und selbständige Urteilsbildung der Schüler nicht zu unterbinden.

Nicht nur Philosophie erzieht zur Vernunft, und Philosophie erzieht nicht nur, aber sicher auch zur Vernunft; jedenfalls liegt hierin seit jeher ihr Anspruch. Welchen Beitrag kann nun das Philosophieren mit Kindern in der gegenwärtigen Rationalitätskrise leisten, um den traditionellen Anspruch weiter einzulösen?

"Rationalität" ist nicht einfach ein Fremdwort für "Vernunft". In der Übersetzung steckt vielmehr eine Bedeutungsverschiebung. Denn lateinisch "ratio" bedeutet primär "Rechnung, Berechnung". Die Krise der rechnenden Vernunft in einer zerstörten und verwalteten Welt ist unterdessen zu einem Allgemeinplatz geworden. Weniger deutlich ist die Abfärbung auf die Vernunft insgesamt. Sie gilt zunehmend als kalt, inhuman und einengend. Erziehung zur Vernunft gilt als altmodischer, hilfloser Appell oder Unterdrückung des wahren Menschlichen, erst recht der unbeschwerten Kindheit. Kinder sollen spielen, vernünftig werden sie früh genug. Kreativität, Phantasie und Emotionalität haben eher eine Chance auf Gehör in der pädagogischen Praxis, oft in alter Anhänglichkeit gekoppelt mit dem Wort Vernunft. Mit dem Einzug der Computer in Schule und Kinderzimmer spitzt sich die Problemlage zu: Computer denken - Menschen fühlen.

Philosophieren mit Kindern muß einen Beitrag leisten, dieser für den einzelnen und die Gesellschaft gefährlichen Dichotomisierung entgegenzuarbeiten. In einem längerfristigen Projekt "Veränderung des Denkens durch Computer" möchte ich theoretisch und praktisch untersuchen (lassen), ob und wie "Philosophy for Children" und "Computer for Children" (Papert u.a.) zusammenwirken können: $P \neq C$ und $C \neq C$.

William S. Hamrick (Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, USA)

Civic Virtue : Democracy and the Philosophy for Children Program

This essay shows how the Philosophy for Children program in both its materials and methods educates children to participate actively and productively in a democratic society and also provides them with crucial help for developing what Aristotle referred to as "civic virtue".

Law, which is "our most structured and revealing social institution" (Ronald Dworkin), discloses the necessary conditions of schools fulfilling these aims, and certain decisions by the United States Supreme Court clearly articulate those conditions. Despite the substantial differences between American and European legal systems, and between the circumstances of the origin and development of our respective societies, the legal reasoning discussed here expresses what is required anywhere for the maintenance of a democratic society and civic virtue within it. In this paper, I discuss these requirements and show how the Philosophy for Children program can help satisfy them.

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Vicki Hansen Walker

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L'IREF no vol cloure aquesta memòria sense mostrar el seu agraïment a totes aquelles persones i institucions que han fet possible la realització d'aquest II Congrés de Filosofia per Nens:

El Centre UNESCO de Catalunya, l'Ajuntament de Santa Cristina D'Aro, La Fundació Jaume Bofill, La Diputació de Girona, Els Instituts de Ciències de l'Educació de les tres Universitats Catalanes i la Conselleria d'Educació de la Generalitat de Catalunya.

Barcelona, 29 de Juny 1987.

IREF
INSTITUT DE RECERCA
PER L'ENSENYAMENT
DE LA FILOSOFIA.

En marcha el proyecto «Filosofía para niños»

Barcelona. MAITE RICART

Se ha creado en Barcelona el Instituto de Investigación para la Enseñanza de la Filosofía (IREF), como resultado del I Congreso de la Filosofía para Niños, celebrado en Gerona en 1986. El grupo promotor del IREF está constituido por un grupo de cinco profesores de Filosofía de distintos Institutos de Bachillerato de Cataluña, y su objetivo prioritario es poner en marcha el proyecto denominado «Filosofía para niños», cuyo núcleo central lo constituye la voluntad de dotar a los estudiantes de un método de adquisición de habilidades de pensamiento que les permita fundamentar sólidamente su vida intelectual.

«Filosofía para niños» es un programa que nació en Nueva York hace quince años y su responsable directo es el doctor Matthew Lipman, director del Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, de la Universidad de Upper Montclair de New Jersey, que tiene Institutos afiliados en Brasil, México, Chile, Taiwán, Australia, Francia, Dinamarca, Alemania, Portugal, Holanda e Israel. El programa Lipman pretende estimular las habilidades del pensamiento desde la escuela primaria hasta la secundaria. El currículum consiste en un conjunto de seis novelas.

Comença demà a Santa Cristina d'Aro

II Congrés internacional de «Filosofia per a nens»

JOSEPHUS

Santa Cristina d'Aro.— Demà dilluns comença a la vila de la Vall d'Aro el II Congrés internacional de «Filosofia per a nens», que ha organitzat l'Institut de recerca per a l'ensenyament de la filosofia, (IREF), amb la col·laboració de la Unesco de Catalunya, la Fundació Jaume Bofill, els instituts de ciències de l'educació, la participació de la Generalitat de Catalunya i l'acolliment de l'Ajuntament de Santa Cristina d'Aro. Les sessions de treball seran dirigides pel professor Mathew Lipman, creador del projecte «Philosophy for Children of Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children of New Jersey, EUA». Hi estan convidats altres representants estrangers dels centres que investiguen en aquesta línia, com poden ésser Àustria, Suècia, Portugal, així com es compta amb la participació d'una trentena de congressistes, que al mateix temps són ensenyants de primària i secundària de Catalunya, País Valencià i Euskadi.

Ampli programa de treball

Els actes es desenvoluparan a partir de les 10 hores del matí de demà dilluns a la sala d'actes de l'hotel Golf de Santa Cristina d'Aro, començant amb una conferència de premsa «per tal d'infor-

mar sobre el congrés, presentar els participants estrangers i anunciar les diferents activitats de la setmana. Posteriorment, a les 12 del migdia, obertura formal de les sessions, amb la presentació de l'IREF i una ponència del Dr. Lipman, continuant seguidament amb altres sessions de treball».

Per dimars dia 16, està prevista a les sis de la tarda, «una sessió oberta per a no congressistes, en la qual es farà una discussió pública del contingut i objectius del projecte «Filosofia per a nens», on seran especialment convidats professors de filosofia i gent vinculada al món de l'educació», per continuar els propers dies amb reunions de treball i cloure el congrés al migdia de divendres dinou de juny amb les conclusions i propostes d'interès.

Irene de Puig, professora gironina, que és una de les organitzadores d'aquest segon congrés, ha explicat a aquest diari que, «del que es tracta, fonamentalment, és d'introduir la filosofia, que ara es fa només a partir dels setze anys, en el BUP, a partir del sis anys, com si fos un aprenentatge més. Quan els nens aprenen, ho aprenen tot junt. Aprenen a pensar, a classificar, a distingir i a ordenar. La filosofia pot ésser una eina que li serveixi per ajudar-lo a fer totes aquestes coses...».

instituts de ciències de l'educació de les universitats catalanes, la Diputació de Girona i la Generalitat— compten amb la participació d'especialistes de diversos països europeus



Comença el segon congrés de filosofia per a nens.- Començà ahir al matí a Santa Cristina d'Aro el II Congrés internacional de filosofia per a nens, que ha organitzat l'Institut de Recerca per l'ensenyament de la filosofia, amb la col.laboració de l'Unesco de Catalunya, la Fundació Jaume Bofill, els tres instituts de ciències de l'Educació i la participació de la Generalitat. Les sessions de treball, que es porten a terme a l'Hotel del Golf de Vall d'Aro, estan dirigides pels professors Mathew Lipman i es desenvolupen en jornades de matí i tarda assistint-hi congressistes d'Àustria, Suècia, Portugal, i altres països d'Europa, així com una trentena d'ensenyament de primària i de secundària de Catalunya, València i Euskadi. Per demà dimarts, dia 16, a partir de les sis de la tarda, està prevista una sessió oberta a no congressistes en què es farà una discussió pública del contingut i objectius «Filosofia per a nens», on hi seran especialment convidats professors de filosofia i gent vinculada al món de l'educació. (Foto CARLOS SANS).

Lipman pensa que és la clau per fer competir els homes amb ordinadors

El pare de la filosofia per a nens en diu que garanteix la democràcia

SANTA CRISTINA D'ARO. (De la nostra Redacció, per X.P.). — Matthew Lipman, promotor de la iniciativa que els infants aprenquin filosofia a l'escola, va afirmar ahir a Santa Cristina d'Aro que la pervivència de la democràcia «depèn del foment de l'esperit crític entre els més petits». La segona jornada del II Congrés Internacional de Filosofia per a Nens va tenir com a acte central ahir l'explicació de com va néixer la idea d'introduir la filosofia en els primers nivells d'ensenyament. El professor Matthew Lipman —de l'Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, del Montclair State College nord-americà—, pare d'aquest programa escolar, exposà, al llarg de la seva intervenció, el seu convenciment que avui dia «les persones no únicament han de treballar, sinó que també han de pensar, per poder-se guanyar la vida».

Lipman recordà l'origen casual del seu interès per introduir la filosofia dins els programes d'ensenyament dels primers cursos. «Jo era professor a la universitat i mai no m'havia plantejat seriosament l'ensenyament als nivells inferiors. A partir del 1968, però, vaig adonar-me que no hi havia cap procés de formació programat en el procés de raonament dels infants», aquell dia va ser la circumstància que impulsà Lipman a plantejar-se el tema: «Els meus fills, per exem-



Matthew Lipman, pare de la filosofia per a nens, va dir ahir a Santa Cristina d'Aro que, «a més de treballar, cal pensar per guanyar-se la vida». Foto: Lluís Vilardell.

ple, no reben a l'escola cap tipus de coneixement orientat cap a aquest objectiu. Això em va moure a treballar en la idea de fer entrar la filosofia en els programes d'ensenyaments primari i secundari».

En una de les seves primeres experimentacions amb col·lectius d'alumnes del programa que preparà, Matthew Lipman va notar que, en nou setmanes d'introducció de l'aprenentatge de la filosofia com a assignatura, els joves estudiants havien fet una progressió d'agilitat mental que

els feia augmentar en una mitjana de dos anys i tres mesos el seu coeficient d'intel·ligència. Els avenços quedaven, però, anul·lats, si no es continuava amb la pràctica dels exercicis filosòfics, segons va poder comprovar.

El professor nord-americà pensa que l'aplicació a l'escola de l'ensenyament de la filosofia per als nens és tan o més viable i necessari com el de les matemàtiques i assegura que produeix «un impacte immediat sobre

l'augment de les habilitats acadèmiques tradicionals».

Convençut que un ensenyament «sistemàtic i progressiu» de la filosofia entre els infants ha de fer que «els homes de demà siguin capaços de competir amb les computadores», Lipman no acaba d'entendre com és que el govern dels Estats Units «ha donat un suport tan important al programa que apropa la filosofia als més petits per fomentar-los, també, un nivell més alt en les àrees de comprensió, escriptura i càlcul».

Els congressistes valoren positivament el caràcter internacional del mètode

Finalitza amb èxit el congrés de filosofia per a nens

JOSEPHUS

Santa Cristina d'Aro.— Finalitza aquest migdia a Santa Cristina d'Aro el II Congrés Internacional de Filosofia per a nens que des del passat dia 15 s'ha vingut desenvolupant en les instal·lacions de l'hotel del Golf cristinenc. Aquest II congrés ha estat organitzat per l'Institut de recerca per l'ensenyament de la filosofia, amb la col·laboració de la UNESCO de Catalunya, els 3 instituts de Ciències de l'educació, la Diputació de Girona i la Generalitat de Catalunya. En les sessions de treball que s'han portat a terme en jornades de matí i tarda, hi han participat congressistes d'Àustria, Suècia, Portugal, així com de Catalunya, València i Euskadi; dirigits pel professor Lipman, creador del projecte.

En la jornada d'ahir a la tarda foren donades a conèixer les conclusions finals d'aquest II Congrés que, segons els participants, «ha estat tot un èxit», volent remarcar la importància del projecte manifestant públicament que «subratllem la gran aportació de la filosofia per a nens a la formació de ciutadans amb un pensament personal, sòlid i rigurós i amb un tarannà crític, dialogant i democràtic. Això és molt important en la nostra època, quan el ressorgiment de la filosofia com a disciplina humanística s'ha de potenciar amb serio-



Aquest matí es farà la clausura del II Congrés Internacional de Filosofia per a nens que s'ha celebrat a Santa Cristina. (Foto CARLOS SANS).

sitat i exigència.

En segon lloc creiem que el diàleg que la filosofia per a nens converteix en eix del seu mètode ofereix un marc idoni per substituir la competitivitat escolar per la cooperació intel·lectual i la creixent indiferència o avorriment de molts alumnes i professors per un estil de treball

corresponsable i il·lusionat. I, en tercer lloc, valorem molt positivament el caràcter internacional d'aquest mètode, que a nosaltres ens permet de retrobar-nos a un nivell nou amb la gran tradició filosòfica europea, conduïda sempre per la gran idea de la recerca coratjosa i sincera de la veritat, la justícia i la coopera-

ció».

Per demà divendres, com a dia final de les jornades d'aquest II Congrés, estan previstes pel matí unes sessions basades en comunicacions sobre experiències fetes durant el present curs escolar, així com una relació de propostes a fer sobre futurs projectes educatius mitjançant aquest sistema.

En los programas de enseñanza primaria podría ser una realidad en el marco de la reforma educativa que ha emprendido la Generalitat. Así lo manifestó un funcionario del Departamento de Enseñamiento en el acto de clausura del II Congreso Internacional de Filosofía per a Nens celebrado durante esta pasada semana en Santa Cristina d'Aro.

El congreso, organizado por el IREF y que ha contado con la presencia del norteamericano Matthew Lipman, que es el creador del proyecto "Philosophy for Children", ha reunido a una treintena de maestros y profesores de

modo que el diálogo (que la filosofía para niños convierte en el eje de su método) ofrece un marco idóneo para sustituir la competitividad escolar por la cooperación intelectual y la creciente indiferencia (o aburrimiento) de muchos alumnos y profesores por un estilo de trabajo corresponsable.

Finalmente valoran positivamente el carácter internacional del método, "que nos permite reencontrarnos a un nivel nuevo con un grado de tradición filosófica europea, conducida siempre por el gran ideal de la búsqueda tenaz y sincera de la verdad, la justicia y la cooperación".

FILOSOFIA

L'art d'aprendre a aprendre

Les paraules Filosofia i nens de costat farà mal d'ulls a més d'un. No cal esperar-se; intentarem mostrar que no són antagòniques, ans al contrari, pretenem que són i poden esdevenir sinònimes.

De fet, si ens ho mirem amb un xic més de calma, entre els filòsofs i els nens hi ha alguna coincidència fonamental. Si acceptem, com diu Aristòtil, que «el que va moure els homes a fer les primeres indagacions filosòfiques fou l'admiració», no hi ha dos sers més predisposats a l'admiració, a descobrir el món, a la badoqueria general, que els nens i els filòsofs. Un dels senyals inequívocs que l'home filòsofa, segons Jaspers, és justament la capacitat de fer preguntes que ja es mostra en els nens: «No és gens estrany sentir d'una boca infantil qüestions o afirmacions que penetren a les profunditats del filosofar (...) Un infant escolta la història de la creació 'Al principi Déu va crear el cel i la terra...' i pregunta a l'acte: I què hi havia abans del principi?».

La ingenuïtat, el desconcert i fins i tot el desfici del nen, s'assemblen molt a la inquietud, a la impaciència i al desassossec del filòsof.

Molts ensenyants de diversos països s'han adonat d'aquesta coincidència (en aquests moments hi ha una extensa bibliografia sobre el tema) i s'han posat a treballar en aquesta direcció: integrar la reflexió filosòfica a l'escola. En un recent Congrés a Àustria —maig del 87— s'ha pogut fer una avaluació dels materials i experiències que hi ha arreu del món sobre aquest tema. A més de 17 països hi ha ensenyament de filosofia per a nens; els punts de partida i els materials usats varien molt d'una latitud a l'altra, però solen tenir en comú una vessant literària: el conte tradicional o elaborat pel mateix mestre —Dinamarca—, la literatura de ciència-ficció —Anglaterra—, o les novel·les convencionals, solen ser les eines bàsiques a partir de les quals es fa la reflexió.

APRENDRE A APRENDRE

Davant l'abundància i varietat de recursos, hom es pot preguntar: a què ve aquesta fal·lera? es tracta d'una moda o respon a una necessitat real?


No és fàcil donar una resposta que inclogui totes les diversitats, però creiem que en el fons hi ha una colla de motius coincidents en moltes d'aquestes experiències. Intentarem esbrinar-ne alguna raó, justificant també així el nostre propi interès:

Creiem, en primer lloc, que la instrucció tradicional que es dona actualment a les escoles no és suficient ni està adaptada a un món canviant encaixat per una tecnologia que fa reciclar constantment els continguts educatius. Qui podia imaginar fa quatre dies que els nens anirien a classe amb una calculadora a la butxaca? Cada vegada és més evident que l'escola no ha de ser un lloc on aprendre a ... (el que sigui), sinó un espai on s'apregui a aprendre, on es doti d'eines mentals i utilitat intel·lectual l'individu perquè ell mateix, pels seus interessos i la seva especialització, pugui situar i assimilar les diverses informacions; en definitiva, un lloc on s'ensenyi a pensar.


En un segon sentit, el món de la comunicació, les facilitats de viatjar, el bombardeig de la informació diària... ens posen en contacte amb nous problemes, ens mostren situacions noves sobre les quals no tenim criteris aferrats. Els mitjans de comunicació o l'experiència pròpia em situen davant d'actituds o esdeveniments que no em deixen indiferent, sobre els quals «sento» que hauria de pensar alguna cosa: la biogenètica, la nuclearització de la terra... i un llarg etc. Però com aclarir les pròpies posicions, en base a què, argumentant de quina manera...? I si això ens passa a nosaltres, adults plens de conviccions sòlides, com hem d'esperar que es trobi un infant d'avui en aquest món del demà si no li facilitem la tasca?

PENSAR PER SI MATEIX

I encara una tercera reflexió, i no pas la menys important. La nostra societat democràtica i la llei del diàleg polític pressuposen uns ciutadans conscients i crítics que dialoguin, es barallin i discuteixin, però amb rigor



Pensar, reflexionar, des de petits, suposa donar els mitjans per tenir, un altre dia, capacitat de decisió pròpia



i tolerància. Si volem una societat d'homes cívics i responsables hem de començar a educar els nostres nens en aquesta direcció. Si volem allunyar el fantasma del totalitarisme i esborrar tota mena de fanatismes s'han de crear les condicions propícies. No hi ha cap possibilitat de transformar nens o joves incapaces de reflexionar en homes capaços de pensar per si mateixos.

En paraules de John Dewey: «La democràcia serà una farsa si els individus no són preparats a pensar per ells mateixos, a jutjar independentment, a ser crítics, a ser capaços de discernir les propagandes subtils i els motius que les inspiren. La producció en massa i la reglamentació uniforme s'han desenvolupat fins al punt que l'oportunitat individual ha disminuït. Cal revertir el corrent. El motiu ha de ser: Aprenere a actuar amb i pels altres mentre s'apregui a pensar i jutjar per si mateix».

I ull viu, perquè si no els ensenyem a pensar per ells mateixos, algú ho farà per ells.

Segurament que qualsevol d'aquests motius seria suficient per justificar un canvi d'enfocament en l'ensenyament; tots tres alhora ja fan un bon feix. Ara bé, per què ho assumeix o ho vol assumir la filosofia?

social— que provoquen incerteses, inseguretats i insatisfaccions davant dels hàbits vells o nous; les tradicions retrògrades o les que sorgixen. Aquesta és la situació personal col·lectiva dels joves d'avui que tenen el doble repte de superar els entrebancs de l'edat: els que li van generant el món on viuen. En opinió de Bertrand Russell: «La filosofia forneix un antídoto a les ansietats i a les angústies del present, i fa possible la més gran aproximació a la serenitat de què podem disposar en el nostre món torturat i insegur».

EL MÈTODE «FILOSOFIA PER A NENS»

D'entre els diferents tractaments que té l'ensenyament de la Filosofia aplicada als infants, volem remarcar el que promou l'«Institute for the Advancement of the Philosophy for Children» del Montclair State College, a Nova Jersey, EUA, que ha estat pioner i és el que té més solidesa i experiència en aquest camp. De la mà de Mathew Lipman i Ann M. Sharp, varen sorgir ara fa 10 anys els primers materials per a un ensenyament raonat de filosofia per a infants. L'experiència es va fer sobretot als estats de Nova Jersey i de Nova York. Poc a poc es va anar implantant i va esdevenir una assignatura integrada en els plans d'estudi d'algunes escoles públiques i/o privades d'algunes zones que tenen competències en programació. Durant aquests anys moltes institucions i ensenyants s'han interessat pel mètode de tal manera que s'ha adoptat a molts països: Mèxic, Xile, Austràlia, Àustria, Suècia... Hi ha versions i adaptacions del material bse a les llengües de més difusió del bloc occidental. Europa s'ha sumat a aquest carro un xic tardanament, probablement pel pes de la tradició acadèmica que han tingut sempre les disciplines filosòfiques. Els primers a entrar en contacte foren els anglesos i els nòrdics: danesos, suecs i neerlandesos, i aquests darrers anys es pot dir que la resta de països hi han estat interessats, tot i que les aplicacions concretes present moltes divergències.

A Catalunya fa un parell d'anys que hi treballam; l'any passat es va fer el primer —modest— Congrés a Girona per tal de donar una primera informació i provocar l'experimentació d'alguns materials i, en definitiva, per difondre el mètode entre els ensenyants. Paral·lelament hem anat fent una tasca de sensibilització de diverses institucions i organismes amb resultats desiguals. Aquest curs 1987 el suport moral i econòmic de la Unesco de Catalunya i de la Fundació Jaume Bofill ens han donat l'empenta definitiva per a la consolidació del projecte.

El grup promotor s'ha convertit amb l'IREF: Institut de recerca per l'ensenyament de la Filosofia, amb la voluntat de formar un col·lectiu d'ensenyants interessats en investigació educativa, sobretot en experiències i projectes dins el marc —en sentit molt ampli— de la filosofia. Ara ens hem imposat com a tasca la traducció, adaptació, difusió i experimentació del mètode «Philosophy for Children».

MILLORAR EN EXPRESSIÓ I EN MATEMÀTIQUES

L'IREF, com a institut de Recerca, és obert a tots els projectes que estiguin interessats per l'ensenyament de la filosofia des de qualsevol aspecte: temàtic, metodològic, didàctic, innovador..., tant si ve des de les escoles d'ensenyament primari o secundari, com si prové d'un país o un altre. D'entre tots els projectes que els membres de l'IREF hem tingut ocasió de conèixer, i fins de participar-hi, certament l'oferta de M. Lipman té avantatges considerables. Especifiquem-ne alguna:

«Philosophy for Children» és un currículum complet que abraça d'una banda tots els àmbits tradicionalment filosòfics: lògica, ètica, estètica... i de l'altra està pensat com a sistema progressiu i abraça tot el cicle que va des de l'inici de l'escola primària fins al final de la secundària, és a dir, de 6 o 7 anys fins als 15 o 16.

Tot aquest embalum es concreta en un material: una novel·la per al noi i un llibre d'orientació per al professor, que engloba

una àrea filosòfica i afecta directament un aspecte educatiu.

Té, a més, l'avantatge d'haver estat experimentat i avaluat, i els resultats han estat espectaculars: no afecten només la capacitat de raonament, sinó que a nivell escolar hi ha notables millores en lectura i expressió i matemàtiques.

Aquesta proposta americana no tan sols incideix en el contingut dels coneixements i ajuda el noi a descobrir pensar per ell mateix i el fa analític i crític, sinó que esdevé també tot un nou —o molt vell— plantejament del que pot de ser una classe de filosofia. Molts dels qui llegiu l'article sabeu què vol dir —molt sovint— una classe de filosofia: un espai on el professor «clava el rotlló» i els alumnes l'escolten, agafen apunts o fan la migdiada. Poques vegades hi ha una relació que vagi més enllà d'aquesta dinàmica dirigista. En el projecte que presentem hi ha un acord perfecte entre contingut i mètode. Aquí el noi és el verdader protagonista, són els alumnes els qui decideixen els continguts segons els seus interessos, i són ells els qui marquen les pautes de treball, basades sempre en el diàleg.

EL DIÀLEG COM A MÈTODE

I heus aquí la paraula clau del mètode Lipman: el diàleg. Tornar a fer del noi una persona dialogant, un conversador, matar definitivament l'espectador mut i passiu, retornar a fer de l'alumne un membre actiu d'un col·lectiu —comunitat de diàleg— que intervé, argumenta, discuteix, pren decisions, convenç o busca raons per defensar la seva opinió.

La poca experiència autòctona que tenim —aquest any només 6 professors, i en situacions precàries, hem treballat amb aquest mètode ha estat sorprenent. A final de curs, els mateixos nois/noies han valorat molt positivament les discussions i el no intervencionisme del professor.

Tots nosaltres, un bon dia, vàrem descobrir que parlar, dialogar, conversar, era molt més enriquidor que no ens pensàvem. Vàrem adonar-nos que en la discussió érem capaços de buscar arguments que no se'n havien acudit en fred, que el matis que donava l'altre s'havia de tenir en compte... vàrem ser conscients del valor del diàleg. Aquest és el sentit que té per a tots el verb ENRAONAR, que marca clarament la relació del pensament i el llenguatge, una persona enraonada és una persona sensata, amb seny, així com l'enraonar no és sinònim de xerrotejar, barbollar o parlotejar, sinó que significa conversar, parlar, discutir i fins examinar o escatir.

D'enraonar en sap tothom, podeu dir. Si, però n'hi ha que en saben més. I que no en sap tothom, d'enraonar? Més o menys. El cas és que no és pas una disciplina gaire cultivada ni a les escoles ni a les famílies. No vull entrar en el tema de la manca de diàleg a les famílies, perquè cadascú s'ho sap i és feina dels sociòlegs esbrinar què passa. Ara bé, el sistema educatiu actual no només no promou el diàleg, sinó que el defuig, i no sempre per culpa dels mestres o educadors, sinó per les condicions intrínseques d'un ensenyament prehistòric: rigidesa dels programes, falta de lògica en els criteris de selecció d'alumnat, quaranta alumnes per aula... A l'alumne no tan sols no se l'anima a parlar, sinó que se'l fa callar.

—Cal retrobar el diàleg a les aules. Aquesta matèria exigeix reflexió personal, tempteig conceptual, assimilació noves propostes capacitat creativa, domini del llenguatge... per això creiem que l'eina adequada és la discussió, el diàleg, la conversa si voleu, però una conversa organitzada, instructiva i racional. El valor autocorrector del diàleg, el paper de la indagació i aprofundiment d'una conversa poden ser, n'estem segurs, uns mitjans valuosos per als nostres escolars, i cal recordar que es fonamenta en un dels mètodes més antics de la filosofia: el diàleg socràtic.

Aprofitarem, doncs, les converses —articulades lògicament— que sobre veritat, falsedat, justícia, realitat, persones i coses, saber i conèixer... vagin sorgint de la pròpia experiència i necessitat del noi/a, sempre amb una terminologia adequada, mai amb tecnicismes, partint del nivell del llenguatge ordinari dels alumnes.

IRENE DE PUIG
Membre de l'IREF